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After Ake: Implementing the Tools of an
Adequate Defense
I. Introduction
Since as early as the twelfth century, mental incapacity has
been acknowledged as a defense to criminal conduct.' It was not
until M'Naughten's Case in 1843, however, that the modern in-
sanity defense began its development.2 M'Naughten, on trial for
murder, asserted the defense that he had shot and killed his vic-
tim while under the influence of an insane delusion. The jury
determined that because he was insane at the time of the crime,
1. Acquittal from a criminal prosecution on the ground of insanity was first granted
during the reign of Henry III as a King's pardon. During this period, in order for the
insanity defense to be successfully maintained, an accused had to demonstrate total in-
sanity under the "wilde beeste" test. This test required that the accused be totally de-
prived of reason, thus effectively precluding the use of partial insanity as a defense.
Gray, The Insanity Defense: Historical Development and Contemporary Relevance, 10
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 559, 562-63 (1972).
2. M'Naughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). The legal rule used to determine
insanity in M'Naughten's Case brought about a significant change in the nature of the
insanity defense in that it permitted a defendant to demonstrate only that he did not
know that the act was wrong when it was committed, unlike the early insanity test which
was met by a showing of total insanity. See GRAY, supra note 1, at 564-65.
The modern insanity defense has developed slowly and concomittantly with other
defenses of legal incapacity as the law evolved from an underlying philosophy of strict
liability to one based upon fault. GRAY, supra note 1, at 559. The defense is based upon
the premise that a criminal, determined to be insane at the time of the commission of a
crime, could not have intentionally chosen to commit the criminal act because he lacked
free will or sufficient understanding of the wrongful nature of his behavior. Thus, since
the accused was not morally blameworthy, he should not be punished. See LAFAVE &
Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 311-31 (1986). See also, L. CAPLAN, THE INSANITY
DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINKLEY, JR., 19-20 (1984).
The M'Naughten test, adopted by all U.S. jurisdictions but New Hampshire, was
expanded in the 19th and early 20th centuries by the addition of the "irresistible im-
pulse" rule in the federal and some state courts. Under this expanded rule of law, the
inability to control one's behavior due to mental illness became an alternative to the
requirement of lack of understanding of the wrongful nature of the act. The first modern
break from M'Naughten occurred in 1954 with the adoption of the Durham test by the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1954). While this test was never adopted in any other jurisdiction and was subject to
substantial criticism, it marked the beginning of a series of changes in the prevailing
tests of criminal insanity in the United States. R. REISNER, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEM 566-67 (1985).
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he was not morally blameworthy and, therefore, should not be
punished.' M'Naughten was found not guilty by reason of in-
sanity. Significantly, this case also marked the first time that
psychiatric testimony was accorded special status in that psychi-
atrists were allowed to offer -their opinions as experts in the field
of mental disease and deficiency.'
In recent years, the use of the insanity defense has in-
creased substantially,5 causing considerable controversy and de-
bate.' Concurrent with this more frequent use, the role of the
psychiatrist, particularly the forensic psychiatrist,7 has become
crucial to the successful assertion of an insanity defense.8 In Ake
v. Oklahoma,9 the Supreme Court determined that the assis-
tance of a psychiatrist is not only essential, it is constitutionally
mandated when an indigent defendant can demonstrate that the
3. American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 681 (1983).
4. See GRAY, supra note 1, at 566.
5. During the 1960's, the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was rarely success-
ful. Between 1971 and 1976, after New York changed the hospitalization required for
insanity acquittees to civil hospitalization rather than hospitalization in an institution
for the criminally insane, a 500/, increase in insanity pleas occurred. Robitscher &
Haynes, In Defense of the Insanity Defense, 31 EMORY L.J. 9, 49 (1982).
6. According to the American Journal of Psychiatry, public pressure to modify or
abolish the insanity defense has three sources: the public's frustration with the failure of
the entire criminal justice system; the public's concern that insanity acquittees may not
be subjected to restrictive confinements; and the public's perception that modern psychi-
atric treatment, and the use of antipsychotic drugs, provides dangerous insanity aquit-
tees with an easy way to "beat the rap." American Psychiatric Association Statement on
the Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681, 682-83 (1983).
7. A forensic psychiatrist is one with specialized training and knowledge to provide
assistance in legal matters involving human behavior and mental health. See THE AMERI-
CAN ACADEMY OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, THE PSYCHIATRIST IN THE COURTROOM (Winter
1985).
8. In this regard, one commentator has stated:
If an accused is to raise an effective insanity defense, it is clear that he will need
the psychiatrist as a witness. He will need his aid in determining the kinds of
testimony to be elicited, the specialists to be consulted, and the areas to be ex-
plored on cross-examination of opposing psychiatrists. And he may need him as a
creative contributor to the development of the law.
A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 126-27 (1967).
The Supreme Court has also recognized that "when jurors make this determination
about issues that inevitably are complex and foreign, the testimony of psychiatrists can
be crucial." Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985). See also Goldstein & Fine, The
Indigent Accused, The Psychiatrist, and The Insanity Defense, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1061,
1063 (1962).
9. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
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insanity defense will be central to his case. 10
Twenty-three years ago, in United States ex rel. Smith v.
Baldi," the Supreme Court upheld a state's denial of an indi-
gent defendant's request for additional psychiatric assistance for
his defense.' 2 While Ake v. Oklahoma does not explicitly over-
rule the Court's earlier decision, it creates a new constitutional
right for certain indigent criminal defendants - a right to
state-funded psychiatric defense assistance both at trial and at
sentencing in capital cases.' 3
Part II of this Note reviews the role of the Supreme Court
in promoting the indigents' rights to the "basic tools of an ade-
quate defense or appeal.' 4 Furthermore, it explores federal and
state decisions regarding indigents' rights to expert as well as
psychiatric defense assistance. Current legislation which man-
dates the provision of psychiatric and other expert defense assis-
tance to certain defendants is discussed in Part III. Part IV sets
out the facts and procedural history of Ake v. Oklahoma and
examines the Supreme Court's majority, concurring and dissent-
ing opinions. Part V analyzes the majority's decision, examining
both the level of psychiatric defense assistance that must be pro-
vided and the threshold requirement that a defendant must
meet to receive such assistance. Part V also reviews the legisla-
tive and judicial responses - or lack thereof - to the Ake de-
cision. Because these responses do not consistently uphold the
10. Id. at 83.
11. 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
12. Id. The Court stated: "We cannot say that the State has that duty [to provide
additional psychiatric assistance to the defendant] by constitutional mandate .... Psy-
chiatrists testified. That suffices." Id. at 568 (citation omitted).
13. The Supreme Court, 1984 Term - Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 120, 131
(1985) (the Ake decision is discussed as a leading case of the Court's 1984 term). See
also, Right to an Expert, 5 THE EXPERT AND THE LAW; A PUBLICATION OF THE NATIONAL
FORENSIC CENTER May 1985, at 1 [hereinafter cited as Right to an Expert] (Ake is her-
alded as having created "an important new right for indigent criminal defendants.").
14. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971). An indigent petitioner, con-
victed of murder one month after his previous trial had ended with a deadlocked jury,
requested and had been denied a free transcript of the first trial. In its review of the
North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmation of this denial, the U.S. Supreme Court
noted "that the State must, as a matter of equal protection, provide indigent prisoners
with the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a
price to other prisoners." Id. The Court qualified this by stating that "the outer limits of
that principle are not clear." Id. Subsequent cases, such as Ake, have shaped the defini-
tion of the "basic tools of an adequate defense." Id.
19861
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Ake standard, many indigent criminal defendants are not receiv-
ing the partisan psychiatric defense assistance mandated by the
Supreme Court.
Part VI concludes that the Supreme Court's decision in Ake
provides a valuable defense tool for indigents. Presently, how-
ever, not every jurisdiction furnishes partisan expert defense as-
sistance to indigent defendants, thereby precluding these de-
fendants from raising an adequate, effective insanity defense.
II. Legal Background
A. Promoting the Indigent's Right to the Tools of an Ade-
quate Defense - Role of the Supreme Court
Since the late 1950's, the Supreme Court has taken a leader-
ship role in promoting the rights of criminally accused defend-
ants when poverty denies "[m]eaningful access to justice ' 15 be-
cause the "basic tools of an adequate defense""6 are not
affordable. As early as 1932 the Court held, in a capital case,
that the fourteenth amendment due process clause requires that
the federal government provide heightened procedural protec-
tion for the indigent defendant.17 In 1938, the sixth amendment
right to counsel was extended to all indigents tried in a federal
proceeding which might deprive the defendants of life or lib-
erty.18 The Court did not begin to impose indigent defendants'
rights on the states, however, until more than a decade later in
Griffin v. Illinois.19
Griffin, a 1956 landmark decision for indigent criminal de-
fendants, was the first in a series of cases which identified those
"tools of an adequate defense" that are basic to the outcome of a
fair trial. The Griffin Court held that an indigent defendant,
making an appeal from a conviction for armed robbery 0 had
fourteenth amendment equal protection and due process rights
15. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
16. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971). See supra note 14 and accom-
panying text.
17. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The Court found the trial court's failure
to appoint effective counsel for rape defendants, at a time when rape was a capital of-
fense, to be a denial of fundamental fairness under the circumstances of the case.
18. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1938).
19. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
20. Id. at 13.
[Vol. 7:201
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to a trial transcript at state expense.' Griffin has been followed
and expanded upon by the Court in a number of cases.22
In the 1963 case of Gideon v. Wainwright," the Court de-
cided that the sixth amendment right to counsel was a funda-
mental right24 which the states must guarantee to unrepresented
criminal defendants. On the same day, the Supreme Court held,
in Douglas v. California,25 that the right to counsel must be ex-
tended to any criminal case on first appeal. These rights, how-
ever, are not unlimited. In Ross v. Moffitt,2 6 the Court found no
equal protection right for an indigent criminal defendant seek-
ing state-appointed counsel to perfect a discretionary appeal,
reasoning that "[t]he duty of the State under our cases is not to
duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a
criminal defendant .... 127 In Scott v. Illinois,2 a the Court held
21. "There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has." Id. at 19.
22. See, e.g., Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 193 (1971) (indigent defendant has an
equal protection right to a transcript on appeal); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487,
488 (1963) (indigent defendant's access to a transcript for an appeal cannot be denied);
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 484 (1963) (indigent defendant's equal protection right to
be provided a transcript on coram noblis application upheld); Smith v. Bennet, 365 U.S.
708 (1961) (processing fee for habeas corpus proceeding must be waived for indigents).
23. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
24. "The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamen-
tal and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours." Id. at 344. In Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), it was established by the Court that the sixth amendment
requires the appointment of counsel by the federal government in certain criminal cases,
but that states could not be compelled to do the same, because "appointment of counsel
is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial." Id. at 471. Betts was subsequently
overruled by Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339.
25. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Although Gideon and Douglas were decided on the same
day and deal with the right to counsel for indigent criminal defendants, Gideon was
grounded in the sixth amendment and followed Powell v. Alabama. See supra text ac-
companying note 17. Douglas, however, drew its reasoning from the equal protection
language of Griffin v. Illinois. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22. Neither case
mentioned the other, although they are clearly related.
26. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
27. Id. at 616.
28. 440 U.S. 367 (1979). Although petitioner was fined only $50, the maximum pen-
alty for such offense was $500, one year in jail, or both. The petitioner argued that
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), requires state provision of counsel when a
defendant may be imprisoned for his crime. The Court refused to accept this interpreta-
tion of Argersinger, holding that the sixth and fourteenth amendments require only that
no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to imprisonment unless the state has pro-
vided the assistance of counsel in his defense. Scott, 440 U.S. at 372-74.
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that an indigent defendant, who was fined fifty dollars for shop-
lifting, had no right to counsel for his defense. Similarly, in
Lewis v. United States,29 the Court allowed the defendant's pre-
vious conviction, imposed without benefit of counsel, to serve as
a basis for a second conviction notwithstanding that the previ-
ous conviction was flawed under Gideon v. Wainwright.
Thus, although the Supreme Court has limited the scope of
Griffin, Gideon, and Douglas, through decisions such as Ross,
Scott, and Lewis, the Court has continued to follow its early
precedents in favor of "[m]eaningful access to justice" for the
indigent criminal defendant.30 In 1967 and 1970, respectively,
the Court acknowledged convicted indigent prisoners' rights to
trial transcripts3' and to competent counsel.32  Subsequently, in
1977 and 1984, respectively, the Court held that indigent de-
fendants also have a right to access law libraries or alternative
sources of legal knowledge, 33 as well as a right to effective assis-
tance of counsel.34 These cases demonstrate the Court's willing-
29. 445 U.S. 55 (1980). The defendant's first conviction had been imposed without
benefit of counsel, at a trial conducted before the Gideon decision. At a second trial for
having violated a statute prohibiting convicted felons from receiving firearms, the de-
fendant tried to wage a constitutional collateral attack on his first conviction, under
Gideon v. Wainwright and subsequent cases that held Gideon to be retroactive. Id. at
57-58.
The Court construed the statute as not opening the predicate conviction to collateral
attack, stating that, "under the Sixth Amendment, an uncounseled felony conviction
cannot be used for certain purposes. The Court, however, has never suggested that an
uncounseled conviction is invalid for all purposes." Id. at 66-67 (citation omitted).
30. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
31. Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967). The indigent petitioner's request for a
copy of the minutes of a preliminary hearing held prior to his trial for robbery, larceny
and assault was denied by the state. Id. at 41. His appeal from conviction on these
charges raised the issue of the unconstitutionality of the statutory requirement of pay-
ment for a preliminary hearing transcript. Id.
32. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). Each respondents' guilty plea
was entered on the advice of arguably incompetent court-appointed counsel. Id. at 765-
66. The Supreme Court, while denying the habeas corpus petitions, reaffirmed every
criminal defendants' right to competent counsel and charged judges to enforce proper
standards of performance by attorneys representing criminal defendants. Id. at 771.
33. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). Respondents were inmates, incarcerated
in North Carolina prison facilities, who charged that the sole prison library in the state
was severely inadequate, and there was no alternative legal assistance for inmates. Id. at
818.
34. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The petitioner, who received the
death penalty for a murder conviction, appealed on the ground of ineffective assistance
of counsel. The Supreme Court, while denying the petition for habeas corpus, stated that
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss1/6
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ness to provide indigent defendants with defense tools which are
necessary to insure a fair trial.
B. Indigents' Rights to Expert Defense Assistance
The need for expert assistance from various fields has long
been recognized as an essential element of an adequate civil and
criminal defense.35 Concurrent with the development of modern
scientific testing and diagnostic procedures and their use as evi-
dence at trial was the need for expert testimony to present such
evidence in comprehensible terms. Consequently, courts and
commentators have recognized that expert assistance from all
areas is necessary to insure an adequate defense in certain
cases.3 ' The federal courts have employed due process and effec-
the sixth amendment right to counsel is necessary to protect the fundamental right to a
fair trial. Id. at 684-85.
35. In 1954, Judge Frank recognized that "[a] man may be jailed for life, or even
electrocuted, because he hasn't the money to discover a missing document necessary to
win his case or to employ a competent hand-writing expert or psychiatrist. This is not
democratic justice." Administration of Criminal Justice, 15 F.R.D. 93, 101 (1954) (Ad-
dress of Honorable Jerome N. Frank, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, delivered before the Criminal Law Section of the American Bar
Association).
36. In Ake, the Court quoted from a 1929 opinion written by Judge Cardozo, which
stated that "upon the trial of certain issues, such as insanity or forgery, experts are often
necessary both for prosecution and for defense .... [A] defendant may be at an unfair
disadvantage, if he is unable because of poverty to parry by his own witnesses the thrusts
of those against him." Ake, 470 U.S. at 82 n.8 (citing Reilly v. Berry, 250 N.Y. 456, 461,
166 N.E. 165, 167 (1929)). See also People v. Gunnerson, 74 Cal. App. 3d 370, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 488 (1977) (trial court's denial of indigent defendant's motion for appointment of
cardiac expert to determine cause of death of victim was prejudicial error); English v.
Missildine, 311 N.W.2d 292 (Iowa 1981) (indigent defendant entitled to employ hand-
writing expert at public expense); Commonwealth v. Bolduc, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 634, 411
N.E.2d 483 (1980) (trial court committed error in denying indigent defendant's motion
for ballistics expert); State v. Lippincott, 124 N.J. Super. 498, 307 A.2d 657 (1973) (indi-
gent defendant entitled to expert witness on effects of alcohol on human body in DWI
prosecution); People v. Hatterson, 63 A.D.2d 736, 405 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1978) (trial court
abused its discretion in denying indigent defendant's motion for state paid physician and
psychiatrist to aid in preparation of his defense); State v. Hanson, 278 N.W.2d 198 (S.D.
1979) (indigent defendant entitled to independent expert to evaluate sample of alleged
marijuana distributed to undercover police); State v. Dickamore, 22 Wash. App. 851, 592
P.2d 681 (1979) (right to effective assistance of counsel required state to pay for experts
for indigent defendants when they are necessary).
But see United States v. Spaulding, 588 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1978) (refusal to allow
appointed indigent defendant's counsel funds for fingerprint and typewriting experts was
deemed harmless error where experts would have supplied only slightly helpful evi-
dence); Pickens v. State, 6 Ark. App. 58, 652 S.W.2d 626 (1983) (denial of motion for
7
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tive assistance of counsel considerations to entitle the indigent
criminal defendant to a fingerprint expert,37 a forensic path-
ologist,3 8 investigative services,3" an accountant,40 and blood
independent fingerprint expert at state expense held not an abuse of trial court's discre-
tion); Byrd v. State, 16 Md. App. 391, 297 A.2d 312 (1972) (the appointment of a chemist
to test alleged heroin distributed by defendant not required, absent showing that FBI
chemist relied on by state was unqualified or not impartial); State v. Archambeau, 333
N.W.2d 807 (S.D. 1983) (trial court properly denied defendant's motion to employ, at
state expense, ballistic and fingerprint expert to examine rifle used in shooting); State v.
Tyson, 603 S.W.2d 748 (Tenn. 1980) (no due process or equal protection requirement
that a defendant have any court appointed expert beyond competent counsel).
See also Decker, Expert Services in the Defense of Criminal Cases: The Constitu-
tional and Statutory Rights of Indigents, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 574 (1982) (reviewing cur-
rent status of indigents' access to state funded psychiatric defense assistance); Note, Aid
for Indigent Litigants in the Federal Courts, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 832 (1958) (an examina-
tion of defense aid which is available to indigent litigants in the federal court system);
Note, The Indigent's Right to An Adequate Defense: Expert and Investigational Assis-
tance in Criminal Proceedings, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 632 (1970) (an argument advocating
the provision by the state of more defense services for the indigent defendant); Note,
Constitutional Law - An Accused's Right to Court-Appointed Expert Testimony, 49
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191 (1980); Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent
Criminal Defendants, 47 MINN. L. REV. 1054 (1963) (an evaluation of the problems and
the arguments for and against the establishment of a constitutional right to defense aid
in addition to counsel); Note, Equal Protection and the Indigent Defendant: Griffin and
its Progeny, 16 STAN. L. REV. 394 (1964) (an analysis of the applicability of the equal
protection clause to the indigent defendant's right to equal justice); Note, An Indigent
Criminal Defendant's Constitutional Right to a Psychiatric Expert, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV.
481 (explaining the need for psychiatric defense assistance when a defendant pleads in-
sanity); Note, Criminal Procedure - Providing Indigent Criminal Defendants with
State-Paid Investigators, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 665 (1977) (an analysis of the single
issue of supplying a state-paid investigator to indigent criminal defendants).
37. Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1979). The Fifth Circuit upheld the
trial court's denial of a fingerprint expert but stated "we are confident that a case will
arise in the future where due process and fundamental fairness will require a state to
provide an indigent criminal defendant with expert assistance." Id. at 682. See also
Spaulding, 588 F.2d at 669 (trial court refusal to grant funds to an indigent defendant
for fingerprint experts held to be harmless error).
38. Under the equal protection clause, an indigent defendant is entitled to state
funds to retain expert assistance whenever there is a substantial question about an issue
that requires expert testimony for its resolution, and a defense cannot be fully developed
without such assistance. Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980).
39. Smith v. Enomoto, 615 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 866 (1980)
(holding that upon a showing of need, an indigent defendant has a constitutional right to
investigative services funded by the state); United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (effective assistance of counsel includes an allowance for the indigent defend-
ant to obtain investigative services); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936 (1975) (due process requires allowance by the state of investi-
gative assistance for indigent defendants).
40. United States v. Brodson, 136 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Wis. 1955), rev'd on other
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss1/6
AFTER AKE
tests.4
Where states and the federal government provide expert de-
fense assistance for indigents by statute, such legislation most
often entitles the indigent to any necessary expert services.4 '
When an ex parte hearing shows that such services are neces-
sary, funding may be granted43 or a defendant may be required
to accept a court-appointed expert. 44 Although a judge acting
pursuant to such legislation often has the discretion to deny a
defendant's request for expert assistance if such assistance ap-
pears unnecessary, legislative approval has been an important
element in enabling indigent defendants to obtain expert de-
fense services. 5
C. Indigents' Rights to Psychiatric Defense Assis-
tance - Federal Case Law
1. Supreme Court
a. The Right to Psychiatric Defense Assistance in Non-
Capital, Criminal Proceedings
The 1953 case of United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi4" is
the Supreme Court's only ruling, prior to Ake, on the matter of
state-funded psychiatric assistance for the defense of an indi-
gent. In Baldi, the Court held that the denial of an indigent de-
fendant's motion for a pretrial psychiatric consultation was not
grounds, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957) (dual constitutional
guarantees of due process and right to counsel require that one whose assets are being
held by the Tax Department, pending the outcome of tax evasion proceedings, must be
furnished with an accountant).
41. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (indigent defendant charged with a paternity
suit was entitled to a state funded blood test to determine whether he had a familial
connection to the plaintiff).
42. See in/ra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
43. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
44. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
45. See Corbett v. Patterson, 272 F. Supp. 602 (D.C. Colo. 1967), where the court
stated: "Although laudable legislative provisions have been made in recent years for the
appointment of expert witnesses for indigent defendants, in the absence of legislation
such appointments rest solely in the discretion of a trial court." Id. at 610 (citation omit-
ted). See also Goldstein & Fine, supra note 8, at 1080 ("Courts have generally refused to
hold, in the absence of a statute authorizing it, that defense experts should be paid by
the state.").
46. 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
19861
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a denial of due process. The petitioner, who had been in and out
of mental institutions prior to the commission of the crime, was
convicted of murder when, on the advice of a court-appointed
lawyer, he entered a plea of guilty rather than not guilty by rea-
son of insanity.47 As a matter of law, the jury's consideration of
Baldi's mental competence to commit the crime was precluded
because the entry of the guilty plea admitted his sanity.4 a Thus,
the trial court considered evidence of Baldi's insanity only after
his conviction at the sentencing phase of his trial. On appeal,
Baldi contended that without the assistance of a psychiatrist, he
had been deprived of effective assistance of counsel.'9 The Court
noted that the defendant's mental state had been attested to by
three psychiatrists, one of whom was court appointed: "As we
have shown, the issue of petitioner's sanity was heard by the
trial court. Psychiatrists testified. That suffices."5
The Baldi decision has been erroneously cited by some state
courts to justify complete denial of psychiatric defense assis-
tance to indigent defendants who request but cannot otherwise
afford such assistance.5 1 These courts rely on the language in
Baldi which states: "We cannot say that the State has that duty
[to provide psychiatric defense assistance to the defendant] by
constitutional mandate."52 Baldi is more correctly interpreted as
holding that because the defendant had been provided with suf-
ficient psychiatric defense assistance, he was not constitutionally
entitled to further psychiatric defense assistance at state ex-
pense.5 3 The Court clearly called for psychiatric defense support
47. Id. at 567-68.
48. Id. at 566 n.2.
49. Id. at 565-68.
50. Id. at 568.
51. See Irvin v. State, 617 P.2d 588 (Okla. 1980) and Taylor v. State, 229 Ga. 536,
192 S.E.2d 249 (1972), in which both state courts of appeals relied on Baldi to find no
error in the trial courts' refusals to appoint psychiatrists requested by the indigent de-
fendants. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 436, 271 S.E.2d 123 (1980) in which the
appellate court, citing Baldi as its authority, upheld the trial court's denial of a state
paid investigator for the indigent defendant.
52. Baldi, 344 U.S. at 568.
53. See Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Tex. 1964), aff'd, 334 F.2d 672
(5th Cir. 1965) in which the court held an indigent defendant to have been denied due
process under the fourteenth amendment when his request to the trial court for a psychi-
atrist to assist his defense was denied. The district court, discussing Baldi, stated:
Even though the majority decided that petitioner in the Smith case had not been
[Vol. 7:201
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for the indigent accused when it stated: "Psychiatrists testified.
That suffices. ' 54 Nevertheless, this language has been ignored by
those courts which rely on Baldi to justify the denial of expert
defense services to indigent defendants.
In the Baldi dissent, Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices
Black and Douglas, stated that the Court was not in a position
to judge whether the defendant erroneously had been found
sane by the trial court . 5 He argued that the Supreme Court's
only duty in such a case was to ascertain whether the defendant
had an adequate opportunity to raise the insanity defense. Jus-
tice Frankfurter determined that the petitioner in Baldi had not
had that opportunity"6 due to his double misfortune of having
been enmeshed in judicially created procedural complexities5 7 as
well as incompetently diagnosed by a court-appointed expert. 58
b. The Use of Psychiatric Evidence in Civil Commitment
and Capital Sentencing Proceedings
Baldi is the only pre-Ake Supreme Court decision relating
to indigent criminal defendants' access to psychiatric assistance
at trial. Where an individual faces civil commitment or a capital
sentencing, however, the Court has viewed appropriate expert
denied due process of law, it is believed the majority would have agreed with the
following statement ... in the dissenting opinion:
"A denial of adequate opportunity to sustain the plea of insanity is a denial of the
safeguard of due process in its historical procedural sense which is within the in-
controvertible scope of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
(citation omitted).
Id. at 564 (quoting Baldi, 344 U.S. at 571 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)) (emphasis
added). See also Margolin & Wagner, The Indigent Criminal Defendant and Defense
Services: A Search for Constitutional Standards, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 647, 669 (1973):
In dictum the Court stated, "We cannot say that the State has that duty by con-
stitutional mandate." Nevertheless, the facts of the case show that at least three
psychiatrists did testify at trial - two as defense witnesses and one at the court's
request . . . .Qualifying its holding, the Court stated, "As we have shown, the
issue of the petitioner's sanity was heard by the trial court. Psychiatrists testified.
That suffices."
Id. (quoting Baldi, 344 U.S. at 568) (emphasis added).
54. Baldi, 344 U.S. at 568.
55. Id. at 570 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
56. "[Tjhe accused in this case was deprived of a fair opportunity to establish his
insanity." Id. at 572.
57. Id. at 571.
58. Id. at 572.
1986]
11
PACE LAW REVIEW
psychiatric analysis and testimony as a necessity. 9 In both civil
commitment" and capital sentencing proceedings, the Court has
recognized that expert psychiatric opinions help the finders of
fact to reach a more accurate decision with regard to a person's
mental state.6
In Addington v. Texas,62 a case involving the constitutional-
ity of adult civil commitment, the Court demonstrated its
awareness that psychiatric diagnoses cannot be made by laymen,
stating "[w]hether the individual is mentally ill ... turns on the
meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psy-
chiatrists and psychologists. '6 3 Similarly, in Vitek v. Jones," the
resolution of the issue of a convicted felon's involuntary transfer
from prison to a mental hospital for treatment was considered
by the Court to be "essentially medical,"6 5 thereby requiring ex-
pert psychiatric evaluation. Concurring, Justice Powell recog-
nized that the testimony required in cases involving a determi-
nation of a person's sanity "is often expressed in language
relatively incomprehensible to laymen." 66
While civil commitment is viewed as a serious deprivation
of liberty requiring careful consideration, the Supreme Court
has afforded substantially greater protection to capital defend-
ants at sentencing. In capital sentencing proceedings, the Su-
preme Court has consistently provided the defendant with the
opportunity to present evidence of emotional disturbance as a
59. See Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950). In Solesbee, the Court considered
the constitutionality of the governor's nonreviewable decision in a case involving insanity
brought on by the defendant's death sentence. In its opinion, the Court credited psychia-
trists with the ability to identify the "elusive and often deceptive symptoms of insanity."
Id. at 12. See also Justice Brennan, Law and Psychiatry Must Join in Defending Men-
tally Ill Criminals, 49 A.B.A. J. 239 (1963) (An attorney appointed to defend a case with-
out access to adequate psychiatric expert assistance can often do little but "throw up his
hands in despair."). Id. at 242.
60. Civil commitment is "[a] form of confinement order used in the civil context for
those who are insane, alcoholic, drug addicted, etc. as contrasted with the criminal com-
mitment of a sentence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 222-23 (5th ed. 1979).
61. See infra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
62. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
63. Id. at 429 (emphasis in original).
64. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
65. Id. at 495.
66. Id. at 498 (Powell, J., concurring).
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mitigating circumstance. 67 In Barefoot v. Estelle,6" expert psy-
chiatric analysis and testimony were considered essential by the
Court. The issue in Barefoot was not whether the indigent de-
fendant should be provided with psychiatric defense assistance
but whether psychiatric testimony regarding the defendant's fu-
ture dangerousness 9 could be used by the prosecution in a capi-
tal sentencing proceeding.70 The Court held that despite the un-
reliability of such testimony, due process considerations did not
bar its use by the prosecution. This decision rested on an as-
sumption by the Court that the adversarial system would permit
the defendant to rebut such testimony with his own psychiatric
experts. 71 The Court noted that the indigent defendant had ac-
cess to state assistance 2 and, therefore, could have retained a
psychiatrist to counter the state's witness.73
A decision such as Barefoot would be meaningless to the in-
67. After the determination of guilt in a trial, the sentencing phase ensues. In a
capital sentencing proceeding, the Supreme Court has required that the sentencing au-
thority have a "meaningful opportunity for consideration of mitigating factors presented
by the circumstances of the particular crime or by the attributes of the individual of-
fender." Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333 (1976). In addition, the Court has held
that in a capital sentencing proceeding "the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments require
that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (emphasis in original). Mitigating factors must include any evi-
dence of emotional disturbance. See generally S. DIKE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 52-60 (1982).
68. 463 U.S. 880 (1983). The defendant was convicted of the murder of a police
officer. Id. at 883. At the sentencing hearing before the same jury, the state called two
psychiatrists who testified that the defendant would probably commit more violent acts
and that he was dangerous to society. Id. at 884. On appeal, the petitioner did not argue
the lack of psychiatric testimony for his defense effort, but argued that psychiatrists are
not competent to predict future dangerousness and therefore any sentence based on such
testimony is erroneous. Id. at 884-85.
69. "Future dangerousness" predictions are weighed by the sentencing body in a
capital case as an aggravating factor, which would weigh in favor of the death penalty.
See, e.g., DIKE, supra note 67, at 57.
70. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 884-85.
71. Id. at 899.
72. Id. at 899 n.5.
73. "Psychiatric testimony predicting dangerousness may be countered not only as
erroneous in a particular case but also as generally so unreliable that it should be ignored
.... [J]urors should not be barred from hearing the views of the State's psychiatrists
along with the opposing views of the defendant's doctors." Id. at 898 (emphasis added).
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digent defendant without a state-funded psychiatrist.74 There-
fore, in order for the Barefoot decision to retain its validity after
Ake, the Court recognized that, in the context of a capital sen-
tencing proceeding, when the state presents psychiatric evidence
of the defendant's future dangerousness, the indigent defendant
must have access to psychiatric defense assistance.75
2. Lower Federal Courts
Habeas corpus appeals of prisoners whose claims have been
rejected by the state courts have given the federal courts several
opportunities to rule on state denials of psychiatric defense as-
sistance to indigent criminal defendants. 76  With few excep-
tions,77 federal courts have agreed that there exists a constitu-
tional right to psychiatric defense assistance for indigent
criminal defendants.78 Federal courts which have upheld a state
trial court's denial of an indigent defendant's motion for psychi-
atric assistance in his defense typically do so in situations in
74. In Ake, the Supreme Court recognized that the Barefoot decision required a
defendant to have access to his own psychiatric defense assistance in order to present a
balanced prediction of the defendant's future dangerousness. Ake, 470 U.S. at 84.
75. Id.
76. Due to the passage of 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e), which provides for expert defense
assistance to criminal indigent defendants in federal trials, the denial of psychiatric as-
sistance for an indigent defendant is unlikely to be an issue in a federal criminal case.
See infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
77. See Watson v. Patterson, 358 F.2d 297 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 876
(1966) (An indigent convicted of murder was not denied due process by failure of the
state trial court to provide psychiatric assistance for the defense. The court, finding no
cases directly holding that the appointment of experts is a constitutional requisite, held
that the fundamental fairness test for due process had been met.); Corbett v. Patterson,
272 F. Supp. 602 (D.C. Colo. 1967) (there is no federal constitutional requisite for the
appointment of experts at state expense to assist an indigent with the preparation of his
defense).
78. "While a conflict of authority may appear to result... [from federal court deci-
sions on the constitutionality of state-funded psychiatric defense assistance] a careful
analysis of the cases reveals there is no apparent conflict within any of the several juris-
dictions." Annotation, Right of Indigent Defendant in Criminal Case to Aid of State by
Appointment of Investigator or Expert, 34 A.L.R.3d 1256, 1260 (1970). See Comment,
An Indigent Criminal Defendant's Constitutional Right to a Psychiatric Expert, 1984
U. ILL. L. REV. 481, 505 (1984). The author concludes that while several federal circuits
have expressly held that the state has a constitutional duty to provide an indigent crimi-
nal defendant with an impartial psychiatric expert, most other circuits have implicitly
recognized the state's duty to give the indigent some source of psychiatric defense assis-
tance. Id.
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which the request is for additional psychiatric assistance beyond
state funded psychiatric services already provided to the defend-
ant.79 Where the state has completely denied an indigent crimi-
nal defendant's request for psychiatric assistance or has pro-
vided only minimal services, the federal courts have been more
likely to find a constitutional violation.8
a. Denial of Psychiatric Defense Assistance Affirmed
In McGarty v. O'Brien,8s a First Circuit case decided prior
to Baldi, it was held that a state's denial of psychiatric defense
assistance to an indigent defendant was constitutional.82 Diag-
nosed by two court-appointed psychiatrists as having a "psycho-
pathic personality" but able to distinguish "between right and
wrong," McGarty was denied additional funds to employ two
more psychiatrists before he was convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to death.s On appeal, the First Circuit held that the
state met its due process constitutional obligations by providing
two competent, impartial psychiatrists at state expense.841n the
1983 case of Finney v. Zant,85 the Eleventh Circuit, citing both
Baldi and McGarty, held that a defendant who had been ex-
amined by two psychiatrists, a clinical psychologist and a psy-
chology intern was entitled to "an impartial ascertainment of his
mental condition but not a battery of experts."86 Additionally, in
79. See infra text accompanying notes 81-87.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 90-93.
81. 188 F.2d 151 (1st Cir. 1951). The defendant killed his eight-year-old niece. Mc-
Garty's assigned counsel recognized that his client's conviction was almost certain, be-
cause McGarty had orally admitted to the killing and later signed a detailed confession.
McGarty's counsel therefore concluded that the best defense would be the insanity de-
fense. Id. at 152.
82. McGarty was cited in Baldi in support of its holding that the state does not
have a constitutional duty to provide an indigent criminal defendant with psychiatric
defense assistance. Baldi, 344 U.S. at 568.
83. McGarty, 188 F.2d at 152.
84. Id. at 157. Note that McGarty's defense counsel was seeking additional psychiat-
ric defense assistance because the testimony of the state appointed doctors, who con-
cluded that McGarty was neither feebleminded nor insane, would not have been
favorable to his case. Id.
85. 709 F.2d 643 (11th Cir. 1983). See also Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487 (11th
Cir. 1983) (denial of petitioner's request for psychiatric assistance did not deprive him of
his constitutional right to present evidence of mitigation at sentencing phase of trial).
86. Finney, 709 F.2d at 645 (in its analysis, the court examined both the defendant's
due process right and his right to effective assistance of counsel).
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Utsler v. Erickson,8 7 the South Dakota District Court found that
the state had fulfilled its constitutional duty by providing two
court-appointed psychiatrists to the indigent defendant, even
though the defendant's request for a third psychiatric examina-
tion was denied. The common rationale among the McGarty,
Finney and Utsler decisions was that the state had provided
sufficient psychiatric defense assistance to the indigent defend-
ants (notwithstanding that the findings of the psychiatrists were
not favorable to the defendants), and that a denial of further
psychiatric assistance did not violate the defendants' constitu-
tional rights.
b. Denial of Psychiatric Defense Assistance Reversed
Federal courts which have found that a state has violated
the Constitution by denying an indigent defendant's request for
psychiatric defense assistance have relied most often on the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Bush v. McCol-
lum,8 for example, the state trial court denied the defendant's
request for a psychiatric defense expert, appointing instead a
county health officer (with no specialized psychiatric training) to
conduct an examination. During trial, the county health officer
announced his finding that the defendant was of sound mind.
Bush was convicted of theft, the jury apparently rejecting the
insanity defense. Considering Bush's petition for a writ of
87. 315 F. Supp. 480 (D.S.D. 1970), af'd, 440 F.2d 140 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 956 (1971). The indigent robbery defendant sought to use the defense of "involun-
tary intoxication," which was not recognized by the two court-appointed psychiatrists
who examined the defendant. Defense counsel sought to employ, at state expense, a par-
ticular psychiatrist who recognized the condition of involuntary intoxication. The court
denied this request. Id. at 482.
88. 231 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Tex. 1964), aff'd, 334 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1965). Bush was
a 64 year old indigent who had been adjudged to be of unsound mind in 1924, thirty-
seven years prior to his arrest for robbery. Because the judgment of unsound mind had
never been set aside, the state had the burden of proving Bush's sanity beyond a reason-
able doubt. Id. at 563. Bush's appointed counsel requested psychiatric examinations of
the defendant by both a mental institution and a court appointed psychiatrist. Id. at
561. Both requests were denied and the trial court, instead, used the services of a county
health officer (a general practitioner with no formal psychiatric training) whose examina-
tion of the defendant was limited to taking a medical history and determining whether
the defendant knew his name, birthplace, age, birthday, and the President of the United
States. To discharge its burden at the insanity hearing and at trial, the state relied on
the testimony of three lay witnesses and the county health officer. Id. at 563.
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habeas corpus, the district court held that Bush's trial "without
expert evidence as to sanity ... is so lacking in fairness as to be
a denial of liberty without due process of law, contrary to the
Fourteenth Amendment.""9
Citing Bush with approval, the Fifth Circuit, in Brinks v.
Alabamaa0 held that a fair trial and effective assistance of coun-
sel had been denied to an indigent defendant when his request
for a pretrial sanity investigation was refused.91 In United
States ex rel. Robinson v. Pate,92 the Seventh Circuit held that
a violation of due process occurred when the trial court denied
an indigent defendant's request for a continuance so that he
could contact a psychiatric witness who had volunteered defense
assistance. Given the gravity of the capital case, the circuit court
determined that the trial court's action was unjustified and con-
stituted a violation of the defendant's right to due process.9"
The fourteenth amendment equal protection clause has
never expressly been held to require the provision of psychiatric
defense assistance for indigent defendants.94 However, when the
defendant in Jacobs v. United States5 petitioned the district
court on the issue of whether he knowingly and intelligently en-
tered a guilty plea at trial, the district court ignored the defend-
ant's request for independent psychiatric assistance.96 Instead,
89. Id. at 565 (the court reviewed other federal and state court standards for a
"qualified psychiatrist" and the requisites of an adequate mental examination, and con-
cluded that both the county health officer and his examination were not sufficient to
produce a competent opinion as to the defendant's sanity).
90. 465 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1130, reh'g denied, 410 U.S.
960 (1973).
91. Id. at 449 (The trial judge ignored testimonial letters which were written by lay
witnesses and introduced by the defendant to demonstrate his insanity. The trial judge
also ignored a statement by Brinks' attorney that the defendant was insane.).
92. 345 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1965) (the trial court refused to postpone the trial so that
defense attorneys could locate a private psychiatrist who had expressed his willingness to
testify for the defendant on a pro bono basis).
93. Id. at 694-95.
94. See Comment, supra note 78, at 494. In reviewing the positions of the federal
courts on the issue of psychiatric defense assistance for indigents, the author states that
the federal circuit courts "have rarely alluded to the equal protection clause." Id.
95. 350 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1965) (On the advice of his lawyer, the indigent defendant
pleaded guilty to a violation of the Internal Revenue laws. He later appealed his convic-
tion on the grounds that his mental condition precluded the knowing and intelligent
entry of a guilty plea.).
96. Id. at 572.
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the court relied on the testimony of lay persons and a peniten-
tiary psychologist, finding no substantial issue as to the defend-
ant's competency.97 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the
defendant was entitled to an examination by an independent
psychiatrist, implicitly basing its holding on equal protection
grounds.98 Although the Fourth Circuit has subsequently ruled
that an indigent defendant has no right to a state funded psy-
chiatrist of his own choosing,99 it recently reaffirmed the indi-
gent defendant's equal protection right to expert defense
assistance.100
It has been held that the sixth amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel has been violated by states in cases where
the defendant was denied access to psychiatric defense assis-
tance. In United States v. Edwards,1'0 the Fifth Circuit held
97. Id. (despite the testimony of lay witnesses that the defendant had suffered
memory losses, attempted suicide, and according to penitentiary psychologist's testi-
mony, had a history of mental problems, the district court denied the request for psychi-
atric defense assistance).
98. Though not expressly stated, the language in the case indicates that the court's
conclusions were based on equal protection grounds.
It is obvious that only his inability to pay for the services of a psychiatrist pre-
vented a proper presentation of his case. The Supreme Court has unmistakably
held that in criminal proceedings it will not tolerate discrimination between indi-
gents and those who possess the means to protect their rights.
Id. at 573. Additionally, the court made reference to Griffin v. Illinois, and Douglas v.
California, both landmark equal protection cases decided by the Supreme Court. Id.
99. Satterfield v. Zahradnick, 572 F.2d 443 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 920
(1978). While not overruling or expressly mentioning Jacobs, the Court stated that
"there exists no constitutional right to the appointment of a private psychiatrist of the
defendant's own choosing at public expense." Id. at 445. The Court upheld the defend-
ant's life term for murder because the defendant had access to a partisan psychiatrist.
100. Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1027 (4th Cir. 1980). The indigent defend-
ant, charged with murder, requested and was denied funds to obtain the services of a
pathologist for his defense. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit cited Jacobs and stated:
"[rielying on Griffin v. Illinois, we recognized that the obligation of the government to
provide an indigent defendant with the assistance of an expert was firmly based on the
equal protection clause." Id. at 1026 (citation omitted).
101. 488 F.2d 1154, 1163-65 (5th Cir. 1974). Defendant was arrested for participat-
ing in a bank robbery. His attorney requested and was granted the appointment of a
psychiatric defense expert under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e). See infra note 115 and accompa-
nying text.
At trial, the attorney failed to present an insanity defense after an unfavorable psy-
chiatric exam found the defendant competent to stand trial. Citing a critical interrela-
tion between expert psychiatric assistance and minimally effective representation of
counsel, the Fifth Circuit wrote that Edwards' defense needs had not been met by the
competency examination, and therefore he.had not received effective assistance of coun-
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that the denial of reasonably effective assistance of counsel ne-
cessitated the reversal of the conviction of an indigent defendant
who was not provided with psychiatric defense assistance in pre-
paring and proving his defense. Previously, in Hintz v. Beto,10 2
the Fifth Circuit had held that the denial of an indigent's mo-
tion for a continuance in order for his attorney to study psychi-
atric reports not received until the time of trial violated the de-
fendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. The court found
that the defendant's constitutional rights included a lawyer who
would be given enough time to evaluate reports prepared by psy-
chiatrists. 10 3 Similarly, in Bush v. McCollum,"°4 the Texas Dis-
trict Court noted that the constitutional right to effective assis-
tance of counsel included the aid of a qualified psychiatrist. 10 5
Moreover, in 1977, a Maryland District Court held in Springer
v. Collins'16 that the failure by counsel to pursue a motion for
funding to obtain a psychological evaluation of the defendant
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, thereby entitling
the petitioner to habeas corpus relief.10 7
sel. Edwards, 488 F.2d at 1163.
102. 379 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1967) (Prior to the crime, defendant had been diagnosed
and certified by two medical doctors as a mentally ill person, likely to injure himself or
others if not restrained. After murdering his wife, defendant was found sane by a court
appointed psychiatrist.).
103. Id. at 942.
104. 231 F. Supp. at 560. See supra notes 88, 89 and accompanying text.
105. "In order for Bush in the instant case to have the effective aid of counsel, it
was necessary for his counsel to have the assistance of a qualified psychiatrist ....
Bush, 231 F. Supp. at 565.
106. 444 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Md. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 586 F.2d 329 (4th Cir.
1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 923 (1979).
107. In Springer the court noted:
While 20-20 hindsight is always better than foresight and there can be no cer-
tainty that one or more psychiatrists would have testified at Springer's trial [that
at the time of the incident Springer was insane], and of course no certainty that
an insanity defense could have been successfully asserted at trial, Springer's trial
counsel's failure to discuss same with his client and to explore the possibility of
advancing an insanity defense was outside the range of competence expected of
him as a defense attorney in a criminal case involving a very serious charge.
Id. at 1065. Springer was reversed in Springer v. Collins, 586 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1978).
The fourth circuit looked at the facts of the case and concluded that Springer's counsel
had sufficient experience, both in the use of the insanity defense and with his client, to
have made a competent decision not to pursue the insanity defense in this case. Id. at
332-33. Additionally, the court looked at a physician's findings that the defendant was a
rational and well adjusted person. Id. In reversing the District Court, the Fourth Circuit
did not disagree that a failure to obtain psychiatric defense assistance would amount to
19
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It has been noted that, with the exception of Watson v. Pat-
terson and Corbett v. Patterson,°s federal courts are in funda-
mental agreement over the right to a state paid psychiatrist. 109
In the case of an indigent defendant who has requested and
been denied access to psychiatric defense assistance, the consti-
tutionality of this state action depends on whether or not state
funded help has already been adequately provided. One com-
mentator has noted that the basic federal standard which has
developed requires an impartial and competent psychiatric ex-
pert to assist any defendant who can demonstrate both evidence
of insanity and a crucial need for a psychiatrist's assistance."'
ineffective assistance of counsel where use of the insanity defense is appropriate. In this
case, however, the Fourth Circuit found that the use of the insanity defense was not
warranted, and therefore counsel's decision not to seek psychiatric defense assistance
was competent. Id.
108. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
110. See Comment, supra note 78, at 497-98. Where a defendant has come forward
with some evidence of insanity or an inability to develop intent, and where the defend-
ant can demonstrate that the psychiatrist's preparation, presentation and examination is
substantially necessary to raise an insanity defense, states have been required by the
courts to provide access to an impartial psychiatric expert. Id.
See Matlock v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1236 (6th Cir. 1984) (An indigent defendant is entitled to
psychiatric defense assistance when (1) it is shown that there is a fair factual basis that
the defendant was insane at the time of the offense, and (2) that the insanity defense will
be substantial to his defense.); Finney, 709 F.2d at 643 (a court appointed forensic
team's examination, report and testimony adequately met the state's obligation to the
defendant); Westbrook, 704 F.2d at 1487 (defendant's incarceration at an early age and
its effect on his ability to determine right from wrong is not so complex as to require
psychiatric evaluation or testimony); Bush, 231 F. Supp. at 564 (psychiatric examination
of the indigent defendant by a county health officer with no psychiatric training was not
sufficient).
The American Bar Association is also in agreement with these standards. See ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 7-3.3 (1982). See also George, The American
Bar Association's Mental Health Standards: An Overview, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 338
(1985) (ABA Mental Health Standards, adopted August 7, 1984 by the ABA House of
Delegates).
Standard 7-3.3, Evaluations Initiated by Defense, states:
The right to defend oneself against criminal charges includes an adequate oppor-
tunity to explore, through a defense-initiated mental evaluation, the availablity of
any defense to the existence or grade or criminal liability relating to defendant's
mental condition at the time of the alleged crime. Accordingly, each jurisdiction
should make available funds in a reasonable amount to pay for a mental evalua-
tion by a qualified mental health or mental retardation professional selected by
defendant in any case involving a defendant financially unable to afford such an
evaluation. In such cases an attorney who believes that an evaluation could sup-
port a substantial legal defense should move for the appointment of a professional
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss1/6
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D. Indigents' Rights to Psychiatric Defense Assis-
tance - State Case Law
A large majority of states provide certain indigent defend-
ants with psychiatric and other expert defense assistance
through legislation."' In states without such legislation, there
have been more judicial decisions in support of the indigent de-
fendant's right to a state funded psychiatrist 1 2 than not.113
However, whether the trial court's denial of psychiatric defense
assistance to a particular defendant is upheld or reversed, case
law establishes a legal precedent which places great discretion in
the hands of the trial judges. 4 Without consistent legislative
or professionals in an ex parte hearing. The court should grant the defense motion
as a matter of course unless the court determines that the motion has no
foundation.
111. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., State v. Clemons, 168 Conn. 395, 403, 363 A.2d 33, 38, cert. denied,
423 U.S. 855 (1975) ("state should provide an indigent defendant access to an indepen-
dent expert upon a showing of reasonable necessity by the defendant for such an ex-
pert"); State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 648 P.2d 203 (1982) (A state must make a determi-
nation whether an adequate defense will be available to the defendant without the
requested expert. If not, then the services are necessary and must be provided by the
state.); State v. Anaya, 456 A.2d 1255 (Me. 1983) (an indigent defendant has a constitu-
tional right to those services essential or necessary to an adequate defense); Collins v.
Maryland, 14 Md. App. 674, 679, 288 A.2d 221, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 882 (1972) (expert
services are to be made available only when it is shown they are necessary to afford the
accused an opportunity to present his defense); State v. Suggett, 200 Neb. 693, 264
N.W.2d 876 (1978) (the discretion to appoint a psychiatrist rests with the trial court).
113. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 229 Ga. 536, 192 S.E.2d 249 (1972) (appointing a
psychiatrist is within the trial court's discretion and there is no constitutional duty to do
so); Irvin v. Oklahoma, 617 P.2d 588 (Okla. Crim. 1980) (there is no constitutional duty
to appoint a psychiatric expert to a criminal defendant who makes such a request); Mar-
tin v. Virginia, 221 Va. 436, 271 S.E.2d 123 (1980) (it is within the trial court's authority
to deny the defendant's request for a state paid investigator, which is no different than a
request for a state paid psychiatrist).
114. See e.g., State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 648 P.2d 203 (1982) (the Supreme Court
of Idaho, while acknowledging that a defendant's request for expert services should be
measured against due process standards, held that whether or not a particular defendant
is entitled to expert defense assistance at state expense is in the discretion of the trial
court); State v. Anaya, 456 A.2d 1255 (Me. 1983) (The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
retreated from its earlier standard which would provide an indigent defendant with ex-
pert defense assistance whenever a reasonable attorney would engage an expert. The
court adopted a requirement that the indigent defendant demonstrate to the trial court
that his need for psychiatric defense assistance is essential or necessary to an adequate
defense.); Collins v. Maryland, 14 Md. App. 674, 679, 288 A.2d 221, 224, cert. denied, 409
U.S. 882 (1972) ("[Tlhe majority of jurisdictions, including Maryland, have held that the
supplying of expert pretrial services to indigent defendants in criminal cases at public
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and judicial guidelines, these trial courts can vary widely in the
granting of expert defense assistance to indigent criminal
defendants.
III. Current Legislation Providing Psychiatric and Other
Expert Defense Assistance to Indigents
A. Federal Statute
Recognizing the need for indigent defendants to be provided
with attorneys and supporting expert defense assistance, Con-
gress enacted The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 (now Criminal
Justice Act Revision of 1984).115 In recommending passage of the
proposed bill, President John F. Kennedy wrote:
In the typical criminal case the resources of government are pit-
ted against those of the individual. To guarantee a fair trial under
such circumstances requires that each accused person have ample
opportunity to gather evidence, and prepare and present his
expense is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.").
115. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982 & Supp. H 1984) (originally enacted as Criminal Jus-
tice Act of 1964, ch. 645 § 3006A, 62 Stat. 814) provides for adequate representation of
defendants through the furnishing of attorneys to indigent defendants. § 3006A(e), as
amended by Public Law 91-477 (1970) provides:
(e) Services other than counsel
(1) Upon request
Counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert,
or other services necessary for an adequate defense may request them in an ex
parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceed-
ing, that the services are necessary and that the person is financially unable to
obtain them, the court, or the United States magistrate if the services are required
in connection with a matter over which he had jurisdiction, shall authorize counsel
to obtain the services.
(2) Without prior request
Counsel appointed under this section may obtain, subject to later review, in-
vestigative, expert, or other services without prior authorization if necessary for an
adequate defense. The total cost of services obtained without prior authorization
may not exceed $150 and expenses reasonably incurred.
(3) Maximum amounts
Compensation to be paid to a person for services rendered by him to a person
under this subsection, or to be paid to an organization for services rendered by an
employee thereof, shall not exceed $300, exclusively of reimbursement for ex-
penses reasonably incurred, unless payment in excess of that limit is certified by
the court, or by the United States magistrate if the services were rendered in con-
nection with a case disposed of entirely before him, as necessary to provide fair
compensation for services of an unusual character or duration, and the amount of
the excess payment is approved by the chief judge of the circuit.
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cause. Whenever the lack of money prevents a defendant from
securing an experienced lawyer, trained investigator or technical
expert, an unjust conviction may follow."' 6
Referring to section 3006A(e) of the proposed legislation per-
taining to expert defense services, Senator John Housha testi-
fied: "An adequate representation commonly entails more than
the mere presence of a lawyer in court. To prepare his defense,
he may need investigative, expert or other services."'" 7
Despite its good intentions, section 3006A(e) provides that
compensation for expert defense services shall not exceed
$300.118 In 1970, an amendment to the original bill provided for
a waiver of the $300 maximum "if the court certifies that pay-
ment in excess of that limit is necessary to provide fair compen-
sation because of the unusual character or duration of the ser-
vices."' 9 While the object of the waiver provision may be to
enable defendants to obtain better or more extensive expert de-
fense assistance, it requires the defendant to rely on the court's
discretion, with the result that individual defendants may be
treated inconsistently or unfairly.
Federal courts have construed section 3006A(e) broadly so
as to encompass all areas of expert assistance. 20 The purpose of
the Act, according to the Eighth Circuit, is "to provide the ac-
116. Letter from President John F. Kennedy to Hon. John W. McCormack, Speaker
of the House of Representatives (March 1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2993, 2993.
117. 110 CONG. REC. 18,521 (1964) (statement of Sen. Housha). For a thorough ex-
amination of the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, see Decker, supra note 35, at
599-613 (1982); Kutak, The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 44 NEB. L. REv. 703, 703-25
(1965).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
119. H.R. REP. No. 1546, 91st Cong., 2d Seass. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3991.
120. See United States v. Erb, 596 F.2d 412 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 848
(1979) (a forensic chemist is within the scope of § 3006A(e)); United States v. Chavis,
476 F.2d 1137, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (the term "expert witness" implies the assistance of
a psychiatric expert in both preparing and presenting the insanity defense, to serve only
the defendant's interests); United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 984 (1973) (the court reversed the district court's denial of the appoint-
ment of a psychiatric expert pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) where arrangements for a
court ordered competency examination pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4244 had already been
made); United States v. Brown, 443 F.2d 659, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (the right to a free
transcript is a "service" authorized by § 3006A(e)); United States v. Desist, 384 F.2d 889
(2d Cir. 1967) (the services of an interpreter fall within the scope of § 3006A(e)).
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cused with a fair opportunity to prepare and present his
case,"' 121 thereby enabling the adversarial system to function ef-
fectively. The Second Circuit, holding that the district court's
refusal to appoint a fingerprint expert pursuant to section
3006A(e) constituted reversible error, 122 stated:
[T]he purpose of the Act, confirmed by its legislative history, is
clearly to redress the imbalance in the criminal process when the
resources of the United States Government are pitted against an
indigent defendant .... This does not mean that application for
expert assistance should be granted automatically . . . . But it
does mean that the Act must not be emasculated by niggardly or
inappropriate construction." 3
B. State Statutes
A majority of states provide indigent criminal defendants
with the assistance of a psychiatrist in certain circumstances."'
States provide expert defense services to indigent defendants by
reimbursement or direct provision of funds, 2 5 by court appoint-
121. United States v. Schultz, 431 F.2d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 988 (1974).
122. United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1976) (After being indicted
for bank robbery, the defendant's request for an independent fingerprint expert was de-
nied. Instead, the trial judge advised defense counsel to cross-examine the government
expert to ascertain discrepancies.).
123. Id. at 827.
124. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78 n.4 (1985) (the Supreme Court listed 40
states that make expert defense assistance available to indigent criminal defendants).
125. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 113-3(d) (Smith-Hurd, 1977 & Supp. 1986)
(funding for expert defense assistance, for capital cases only, is not to exceed $250); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.070 (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1986) (fees plus expenses for expert de-
fense assistance is not to exceed $1000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.21 (West 1964 & Supp.
1987) ($300 limit on compensation paid for expert defense services); NEv. REV. STAT. §
7.135 (1957 & Supp. 1985) (reimbursement for expenses for expert services is not to ex-
ceed $300 unless authorized by the court); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:6 (1986) (the
court may authorize counsel to obtain necessary services, not to exceed $300); N.Y.
COUNTY LAW § 722(c) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987) (court may authorize counsel to
obtain expert services in an amount not to exceed $300 unless extraordinary); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(d) (Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1987) (a reasonable fee not to ex-
ceed $500 may be set by the court for investigation and expert testimony). See also HAW.
REV. STAT. § 802-7 (1976 & Supp. 1984) (funding for expert defense services is to be paid
from available court funds); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-454 (1986) (at court's discretion, ap-
proval may be given for fees for the services of expert witnesses); OR. REV. STAT. §
135.055(4) (1985) (reasonable expenses for expert defense services, in the discretion of
the court, may be authorized); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-207(b) (1982 & Supp 1986)
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ment of an expert, 126 or by funding the state's public defender
and legal aid programs. 127 These services are legislatively im-
posed and are, therefore, more consistently enforced than in
states where the trial courts act at their own discretion. 28
C. A Need for More Effective Legislation
The goal of federal and state legislation which deals with
psychiatric and other expert defense assistance in criminal cases
is to provide the indigent criminal defendant with an opportu-
nity to present an adequate and realistic defense.129 Unfortu-
nately, these laws fall short of their goal and do not adequately
meet the indigent defendant's needs for expert defense assis-
tance. The federal government sets a $300 limit on compensa-
(where expert defense services are determined to be necessary, court can authorize ap-
propriate services).
126. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.47.070 (1986) (upon notice of a defendant's
intent to use the insanity defense, the court will appoint two qualified psychiatrists);
ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4013(B) (1978 & Supp. 1986) (Psychiatric experts are court-
appointed, and available for capital offenses only. This statute was extended to non-
capital cases in Arizona v. Peeler, 126 Ariz. 254, 614 P.2d 335 (1980)). See also FLA. CRIM.
L. & R. r. 3.216(a) (West 1986) (upon notice of a defendant's intent to use the insanity
defense, court must appoint defense experts); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-2-2 (Burns 1985 &
Supp. 1986) (upon notice of a defendant's intent to use the insanity defense, the court
will appoint two or three "competent, disinterested" psychiatrists or clinical psycholo-
gists to examine the defendant and testify at trial); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-202 (1981)
(upon notice of the defendant's intent to use the insanity defense, the court will appoint
at least one qualified psychiatrist to examine the defendant); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-19
(1985 & Supp. 1986 ) (upon notice of the defendant's intent to use the insanity defense,
the court shall appoint "one or more disinterested skilled persons"); UTAH CODE ANN. §
77-14-4 (1982 & Supp. 1986) (two alienists are appointed by the court). See also OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.39 (Anderson 1982 & Supp. 1985) (examiners are appointed by
the court, but the defendant may recommend a preferred examiner).
127. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 29 § 4601 et seq. (1983 & Supp. 1986) (creation of a public
defender's office); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. 2A: 158A et seq. (West 1985 & Supp. 1986) (crea-
tion of a public defender's office); W. VA. CODE § 29-21-1 et seq. (1986) (§ 29-21-14(e)(3)
(provides for reimbursement of up to $500 for expenses incurred by public defender cor-
porations for expert witnesses); Wis. STAT. ANN. 977 et seq. (West 1985 & Supp. 1986)
(creation of a public defender's office).
128. See supra text accompanying note 114.
129. Reviewing the federal and state legislation which entitles indigent defendants
to expert defense assistance, the Supreme Court quoted § 3006A(e) of the Criminal Jus-
tice Act to illustrate the federal and state standard for the provision of such assistance,
stating: "Congress has provided that indigent defendants shall receive the assistance of
all experts 'necessary for an adequate defense.' Numerous state statutes guarantee reim-
bursement for expert services under a like standard." Ake, 470 U.S. at 79-80 (1985).
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tion for expert defense services unless a judge determines that
there is a need for "services of an unusual character or dura-
tion." 130 Similarly, the limit set by most state legislatures is also
$300,131 far below what is necessary to pay for effective expert
services."'
States which provide for the appointment of an impartial
expert to render defense assistance for the indigent defendant
often require that the expert's reports and testimony be made
available to the prosecution as well as the defense. 3 An expert
whose services are available to both the defense and prosecution
cannot be expected to provide the defendant with defense-ori-
ented assistance.13 4 An indigent in need of expert defense assis-
tance may, therefore, be better served by a public defender or
legal aid, 135 where defense attorneys may obtain the funds that
are necessary to provide their clients with appropriate expert as-
130. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(3) (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
131. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., L. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 68. In mounting a successful insanity de-
fense for their son's trial for his assassination attempt against President Ronald Reagan,
John Hinkley's parents spent approximately $150,000 on doctor's fees and expenses. The
government was charged over $300,000 by doctors for the prosecution. Id. at 59. The
government's lead expert witness, a forensic psychiatrist, charged fees and expenses of
about $120,000. Id. at 68. While a defendant need not use a forensic psychiatrist as his
expert witness, a less qualified witness would be more likely to be ineffective and more
easily impeached by the prosecution. See also Margolin & Wagner, supra note 53, at 653.
The authors discuss the varying levels of quality in psychiatric expert testimony which
are available to those with greater resources:
The rich could shop for experts without seeking court permission and use only
those experts who are most responsive to any given theory. The rich could employ
more expensive experts and more of them. They could reach out of state for the
most qualified and articulate individuals to pursue even unlikely leads.
Id. at 653.
133. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.070 (1986) (when a defendant intends to plead
insanity, the court appoints two psychiatrists whose reports are available to both the
prosecutor and defense counsel); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-202 (1981) (when a defendant
intends to plead insanity, the court appoints one psychiatrist whose report is available to
the prosecutor and defense counsel). But see FLA. CRIM. L. & R. r. 3.216(a) (West 1986)
(court appointed experts for the defense are subject to the attorney-client privilege).
134. Critics of the impartial expert focus on the lack of consensus among psychia-
trists who may diagnose the same patient differently. An impartial expert who supports
the state's position cannot be challenged by an indigent defendant, who has no resources
available to make the kind of challenges and corrections the adversary process assumes
he is able to make. See, e.g., Decker, supra note 36, at 579 n.33. See also Goldstein &
Fine, supra note 8, at 1071-76.
135. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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sistance. Even these organizations, however, are severely limited
by budget considerations.'13  Given the recognized advantage of
the defendant who is able to choose his own expert,1 37 funding
should be provided in realistic amounts to indigent defendants
who have demonstrated a need for expert defense assistance.'38
This funding would insure that the defendant is able to present
a defense in the most favorable light.
IV. Ake v. Oklahoma
A. Facts and Procedural History
On October 15, 1979, Glen Burton Ake and a co-worker,
Hatch, left their jobs as oil drillers and borrowed a car to search
for a home to burglarize.'3 9 On the pretense of being unable to
locate a neighborhood address, Ake and Hatch gained entry into
the home of Reverend Richard Douglass where Ake shot Rever-
end Douglass, his wife and their two children after ransacking
the house for money and unsuccessfully attempting to rape the
136. See Gideon Undone, The Crisis in Indigent Defense Funding (J. Moran ed.
1983) (This article sets forth the transcript of a hearing held during the Annual Confer-
ence of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association. While reviewing the areas in
which indigent defendants are deprived of competent counsel due to a lack of funding, it
was stated that "[iun most states, lawyers defending the poor must prepare their client
cases without sufficient support from investigators, forensic laboratories or expert wit-
nesses." Id. at 3 (Testimony of Robert D. Raven, Chairman, American Bar Association
Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants)).
137. See Decker, supra note 36, at 611; Goldstein & Fine, supra note 8, at 1076. An
example of the advantage in choosing one's own expert is seen in Ulster v. Erickson, 315
F. Supp. 480 (D. S.D. 1970). There, the indigent defendant sought to employ a psychia-
trist who recognized the condition of involuntary intoxication (or compulsive drinking),
while the two court-appointed psychiatrists who examined him did not. Had the defend-
ant been able to employ an expert of his own choosing, the expert testimony would have
been more favorable to his defense. However, the trial court's decision to deny this re-
quest was upheld by the district court, despite the district court's recognition that there
is "disagreement among medical experts as to 'compulsive' drinking." Id. at 482.
138. See Decker, supra note 34, at 614-15. The author suggests statutory language
that would allow defense counsel to obtain expert defense services whenever it could be
shown that the defendant has a need for such services and is unable to finance them.
The author, seeking to eliminate the trial court's discretion in the matter of whether or
not a defendant requires expert defense services, suggests that only a sworn statement
from counsel specifying the facts and reasons for the defendant's need for expert defense
services, be required for state provision of assistance. Further, the author maintains that
whenever the government intends to use expert testimony, the defendant also should be
provided the means to retain expert defense assistance.
139. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 88 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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twelve-year-old daughter. 40 One month after the shootings, Ake
and Hatch were apprehended. After three days in jail, Ake pro-
vided police with a forty-four page confession to the robbery,
shootings, and attempted rape.""
After their initial arraignment, Ake and Hatch appeared to-
gether in court, at which time Hatch's attorney requested a com-
petency examination. Ake's attorney did not make a correspond-
ing request. 42 At his formal arraignment Ake's disruptive
behavior prompted the court to order, sua sponte, a private psy-
chiatrist to evaluate Ake for competency to stand trial. 43 Ake
was diagnosed as mentally ill and in need of care.144 He was sub-
sequently admitted to the state hospital for a competency
evaluation.
The chief forensic psychiatrist at the state hospital to which
Ake was committed testified that Ake was both psychotic and
dangerous. The psychiatrist concluded that Ake was not compe-
tent to stand trial, required a maximum security facility within a
psychiatric hospital," 5 and was currently unable to distinguish
right from wrong.14" No testimony was given regarding Ake's
mental condition at the time of the offense. 47
Six weeks following Ake's committment to the state mental
hospital, a forensic psychiatrist determined that Ake was then
competent to stand trial. In order to remain "competent," how-
ever, Ake had to be maintained on a moderate level of an anti-
psychotic medication. 48
Prior to trial, Ake's counsel notified the court of his client's
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 89.
143. Id. at 71.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 89 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
147. Psychiatric examination for competency involves a contemporary inquiry with
respect to a defendant's ability to understand the trial proceedings and assist counsel.
To determine the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense, a retrospective
evaluation is conducted. See THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, THE
PSYCHIATRIST IN THE COURTROOM (Winter 1985). A defendant can be competent to stand
trial and yet have suffered from mental illness which caused him to commit a criminal
act. See Ellis & Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 414 (1985).
148. Ake, 470 U.S. at 71-72.
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intention to plead not guilty by reason of insanity. A motion was
also made by Ake's counsel for psychiatric assistance, either
state funded or court appointed, to examine Ake with respect to
his mental condition at the time of the offense. '49 This motion
was denied by the trial court on the basis of United States ex
rel. Smith v. Baldi.'50
At trial, Ake's only defense was insanity.' 51 His three wit-
nesses were the two psychiatrists and one physician who had ex-
amined him solely with respect to his competency to stand trial.
None of Ake's witnesses could testify with respect to his mental
condition at the time of the offense.' 52 The jury was instructed
to find Ake not guilty by reason of insanity if they could deter-
mine that he had been unable to distinguish right from wrong at
the time of the offense. 153 The jury was further instructed to
presume that Ake was sane unless the defense presented suffi-
cient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt to the contrary.154 The
jury found Ake to be sane and guilty on all counts.15 5
At the sentencing proceeding, Ake received the death pen-
alty.' 56 To demonstrate that Ake was dangerous to society, the
state relied on the testimony of the two defense psychiatrists
who had been called by Ake in the guilt phase of his trial. The
defense had no witnesses - expert or otherwise - to present
mitigating circumstances which would rebut the state's claims.15 7
149. Id. at 72.
150. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953)). See supra
notes 12, 46-58 and accompanying text.
151. Id. at 72.
152. Id.
153. Oklahoma, and the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in this country fol-
low the traditional M'Naghten rule under which an accused is not criminally responsible
if, at the time of the offense, "he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from dis-
ease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he
did know it that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." See LAFAVE & Scorr,
supra note 2, at 311.
154. Ake, 470 U.S. at 73 n.1 (referring to OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 152 (1983 &
Supp. 1987)).
155. Ake, 470 U.S. at 73.
156. Id.
157. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 701.10 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987) provides that upon
conviction of first degree murder a separate sentencing proceeding is conducted before
the trial judge and jury at which certain enumerated aggravating circumstances, includ-
ing future dangerousness, can be presented by the state. Mitigating circumstances, in-
cluding insanity, may be presented by the defense to rebut the prosecution's contentions
1986]
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On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma,
Ake's attorney argued that as an indigent defendant, he should
have been provided with the services of a state funded psychia-
trist as inherent in his constitutional right to effective assistance
of counsel. 15 The appeals court rejected this argument, relying
on its numerous prior decisions that, despite the unique nature
of capital cases, the state does not have an obligation to provide
such services to indigents.159 Ake's attorney further argued that
the antipsychotic medication which he was required to take ren-
dered him unable to understand the proceedings against him
and affected his ability to assist his defense counsel.6 0 The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found no merit in this ar-
gument either,' affirming the trial court's verdict and sentence.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
B. The Supreme Court Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
In addressing the denial of psychiatric defense assistance,"6 2
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, reviewed its history of
and to reduce the sentence.
158. Ake v. Oklahoma, 633 P.2d 1 (Okla. 1983), rev'd, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). Ake also
argued that the denial of state funded psychiatric defense assistance deprived him of
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. Id. at 6.
159. Id. (citing Irvin v. State, 617 P.2d 588 (Okla. 1980) and cases cited therein:
United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953); United States ex rel. Robinson
v. Pate, 345 F.2d 691 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 382 U.S 890 (1965); Bills v. State, 585 P.2d
1366 (Okla. 1978); Huitt v. Oklahoma, 562 P.2d 873 (Okla. 1977); Hardt v. Oklahoma,
490 P.2d 752 (Okla. 1971); Bias v. Oklahoma, 561 P.2d 523 (Okla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
940 (1977)).
160. Defendant Ake was maintained on 200 milligrams of the drug Thorazine, three
times per day. Ake, 470 U.S. at 71. Thorazine is commonly used to treat the manifesta-
tions of psychotic disorders and carries with it numerous potential side effects including
the impairment of mental and physical abilities. See 1986 PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE
1728, 1729.
161. The Court stated:
[W]e disagree with the contention that the appellant should have been treated as
an insane person, incapable of standing trial, because of the necessity of
Thorazine treatment to "normalize" him. Psychopharmaceutical restoration of
persons to a state of normality is not an uncommon practice in modern society. If
a defendant may be rendered competent to assist in his defense through the use of
medication, it is in the best interests of justice to- afford him a speedy trial."
Ake, 633 P.2d at 7.
162. Before reaching the issue of psychiatric assistance for the defense of an indi-
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss1/6
19861 AFTER AKE
supporting an indigent defendant's right to a fair opportunity to
present a defense, noting that this right is grounded in the four-
teenth amendment. 6- Where an indigent defendant's life or lib-
erty is at stake, there are both due process and equal protection
guarantees to a fair opportunity to present a defense.16 ' The
Court labeled its role in such fair opportunity cases as providing
"[m]eaningful access to justice."' 65 In so doing, the ultimate goal
is to enable the adversary system to function effectively by en-
suring that both parties are evenly matched for the trial
process. 66
The Court addressed the issue of state-funded psychiatric
defense assistance for indigents by utilizing a three-pronged due
process balancing analysis. 67 The Court balanced the individ-
ual's interest in the accurate outcome of a criminal proceeding,
the state's interests, and the probable value of psychiatric assis-
tance against the risk of error without such assistance at trial.'
gent defendant, the Court considered two preliminary issues: jurisdiction to hear the case
and the defendant's competency to stand trial while under the influence of Thorazine.
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 n.2, 74 (1985).
The state argued that the defendant's claim to a psychiatrist was waived when his
request was not repeated in a motion for a new trial. Therefore, the state argued, the
decision was not reviewable because it rested on adequate and independent state proce-
dural grounds. In rejecting this issue, the Court held that when a federal question is
interwoven into an issue, it is not an independent matter. Id. at 75.
The Court refused to address the petitioner's argument that the Thorazine adminis-
tered to him during trial rendered him unable to understand the proceedings or to assist
defense counsel, declaring that it need not address the issue in light of its disposition of
the other issues presented. Id. at 74 n.2.
163. Id. at 76.
164. See supra notes 15-34 and accompanying text.
165. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
166. Id.
167. This analysis was first articulated by the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 335 (1976). A social security recipient whose benefits had been terminated chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the administrative process. In upholding the termination
procedure used by the Health Education and Welfare Department, the Court looked at
three considerations:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burden that additional or substitute procedural requirements
would entail.
Id.
168. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
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In focusing on the first prong of the due process test, the
Court considered the interest of criminally accused individuals
in ensuring the accuracy of a criminal proceeding. In capital and
non-capital trials, the Court found this interest to be "uniquely
compelling"16 9 where the individual faces the loss of life or
liberty.
In the second prong of the due process test, the Court iden-
tified two state interests in denying psychiatric defense assis-
tance to indigent defendants: the avoidance of the financial bur-
den the state would incur in supplying psychiatric assistance to
indigents17 0 and the strategic advantage which the state might
gain at trial by denying a criminal defendant access to a psychi-
atric expert.17 1 With respect to the potential financial burden,
the Court noted that over forty states17 2 and the federal govern-
ment currently make psychiatric assistance available to indigent
defendants,17 3 reasoning that such a large majority of states
would not provide psychiatric assistance if the financial burden
were too great.1 74 To offset a state's interest in the strategic ad-
vantage, the Court identified two counterbalancing interests
held by the state - fair adjudication of criminal cases and an
obligation not to use any strategy that might result in a flawed
verdict - both of which theoretically would prevent the state
from exploiting its power to deny defense tools to an indigent
defendant. 17  Therefore, the state could not argue that it had
169. Id. at 78.
170. Id. Oklahoma argued that to provide defendants like Ake with psychiatric as-
sistance would result in a "staggering burden." Id.
The Court did not address the possibility of increased use of the insanity defense if
psychiatric defense assistance were available to all defendants. States which have pro-
vided such services presently do not do so at a level which is completely effective. See
supra text accompanying notes 129-138. If partisan psychiatric defense experts were
available to all defendants, the use of the insanity defense might increase.
171. Where the state can deny expert psychiatric assistance to an indigent and use
the absence of such testimony to argue that the defendant did not raise a reasonable
doubt as to his sanity at the time of the offense, the state is effectively denying the use of
the insanity defense. Indeed, the Oklahoma prosecutor can be said to have used this
strategy at trial against Ake. See Segal, Some Procedural and Strategic Inequities in
Defending the Indigent, 51 A.B.A. J. 1165 (1965).
172. Ake, 470 U.S. at 79.
173. Id. at 78-79 n.4. See also supra notes 115, 125, 126 and accompanying text.
174. Ake, 470 U.S. at 78.
175. Id. at 79.
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any financial or strategic interests which would outweigh an in-
digent defendant's right to psychiatric defense assistance at
trial.
The third prong of the balancing test dealt with an interest
theoretically shared by both the defendant and the state:
whether the truth-seeking function of the adversary system
would be improved by state financed psychiatric assistance. The
Court balanced the value of psychiatric experts in the trial pro-
cess against the risk of an erroneous determination at trial with-
out such assistance. 7 6 The Court recognized that modern trial
practice often requires the testimony of a psychiatric expert'7
and that its value in enhancing the truth-seeking process could
make psychiatric defense assistance crucial. Additionally, the
Court stated that psychiatric experts are necessary to avoid er-
ror due to the "elusive and often deceptive" symptoms of in-
sanity.178 Thus, the Ake court held that both the truth-seeking
value of psychiatric defense assistance and risk of error in its
absence weighed in favor of the indigent defendant's right to
such assistance.
In addition to the three prongs of the due process balancing
test, the Court discussed two of its concerns regarding modern
reliance on expert psychiatric testimony. 79 The Court stressed
that the role of the psychiatrist is to assist the jurors in reaching
their conclusions, not to make the jury's decision, and that psy-
chiatry cannot be relied upon by the fact finder as an exact sci-
ence.' 80 Despite its reservations, the Court recognized that the
widespread reliance on psychiatric experts by state prosecutors
would leave an indigent defendant in an unequal position if such
176. Id.
177. The Court considered the pivotal role that psychiatry has come to play in crim-
inal proceedings, again noting that more than 40 states and the federal government guar-
antee psychiatric assistance to indigent defendants under certain circumstances. Id. at
78-79 n.4, 79.
178. Id. at 80 (citing Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 12, reh'g denied, 339 U.S. 926
(1950)).
179. These concerns reflect the "battle of the experts" controversy, which charges
that jurors who are faced with the testimony of opposing psychiatrists in insanity de-
fense cases become so confused that their decision is based on the demeanor and stage
presence of the individual experts. See McGarty v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 151, 156 (1st Cir.
1951). See also Goldstein & Fine, supra note 8, at 1075.
180. Ake, 470 U.S. at 81.
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assistance were not also made available for the preparation of
the defense.1 81
Through a balancing of the foregoing interests, the Court
found that psychiatric defense assistance is necessary, in appro-
priate cases, "to help determine whether the insanity defense is
viable, to present testimony, and to assist in preparing the cross-
examination of a State's psychiatric witnesses."' 12
Thus, the Court held that the denial of psychiatric defense
assistance to an indigent defendant can be unconstitutional 8 3 in
circumstances in which the indigent defendant can make an ex
parte threshold showing'84 to the trial court that his sanity will
be a significant defense issue.'85 The defendant who meets this
threshold is constitutionally entitled to "a competent psychia-
trist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in
evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.' 8
The Court went on to consider the issue of psychiatric assis-
tance for the indigent defendant at a capital sentencing proceed-
ing such as Ake's, 187 again employing the three-prong due pro-
cess analysis. 88 The Court considered whether an indigent
defendant should have access to a state paid psychiatric expert
who would assist in the preparation and presentation of mitigat-
ing circumstances to counter the state's presentation of future
dangerousness as an aggravating factor.8 "
Neither the first nor second prong of the due process bal-
ancing test, individual and state interests, were weighed because
both the state and the individual have a substantial interest in
the accurate resolution of a capital sentencing proceeding. 90 In
considering the state paid psychiatric expert assistance in capi-
181. Id.
182. Id. at 82.
183. "We hold that when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his san-
ity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the Constitution
requires that a State provide access to a psychiatrist's assistance on this issue . Id.
at 74 (emphasis added).
184. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
185. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 67, 69 and accompanying text.
190. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83-84.
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tal sentencing procedures, the Court focused its analysis on the
third prong of the due process balance test: weighing the value
of psychiatric assistance against the risk of error in its ab-
sence.' The Court examined the serious consequence of error in
a capital sentencing, the high probability of error in psychiatric
testimony on future dangerousness, and the value of responsive
psychiatric testimony, concluding that there is a per se due pro-
cess requirement for expert psychiatric assistance. 192 The Court
cited its 1980 decision, Barefoot v. Estelle,'13 in which it was as-
sumed that a capital defendant at sentencing would have the as-
sistance of a defense-oriented psychiatrist to offset the state's
use of psychiatric testimony on the defendant's capability for fu-
ture dangerousness. Barefoot was cited in Ake as proof of the
indigent defendant's need for psychiatric testimony to provide
mitigating factors at a capital sentencing proceeding. 94
Finally, the Court turned to its 1953 decision in United
States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi,195 which the Court chose to distin-
guish rather than overrule. In Baldi the defendant had been ex-
amined by impartial psychiatrists. 96 Furthermore, Baldi was de-
cided before the Supreme Court began to recognize the
fundamental rights of the indigent accused and before psychia-
try became important to the area of criminal law. 197
The Ake majority found that the defendant was entitled to
the assistance of a state paid psychiatrist. The Court noted that
the defendant most likely met the threshold requirement of
demonstrating that the question of sanity would be a significant
191. Id. at 79.
192. Id. at 84.
193. 463 U.S. 880 (1983). See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
194. Ake, 470 U.S. at 84. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
195. 334 U.S. 561 (1953). See supra notes 11, 12, 46-50 and accompanying text.
196. The examination of an indigent defendant by one or more impartial psychia-
trists meets the majority standard held by lower federal courts, permitting a constitu-
tional denial of the defendant's request for further state funded psychiatric defense as-
sistance. Those lower courts which have examined fact situations in which the indigent
defendant has had "meaningful access" to psychiatric defense assistance have held that a
denial of a request for additional assistance is not a violation of the indigent's rights. A
majority of the lower federal courts have found a constitutional violation where the indi-
gent defendant who has had little or no psychiatric defense assistance is denied psychiat-
ric defense assistance by the state. See supra text accompanying notes 108-10.
197. Ake, 470 U.S. at 85.
1986]
35
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:201
factor in his defense. 198 In addition, the Court noted that be-
cause this was a capital sentencing procedure and the prosecu-
tion relied on psychiatric expert testimony as evidence of Ake's
future dangerousness, Ake was entitled to psychiatric defense
assistance at sentencing.199 Because Ake had been denied the as-
sistance of a psychiatrist, his fourteenth amendment due process
right had been violated. Ake's conviction was therefore reversed
and remanded for a new trial in accordance with guidelines pro-
vided in the opinion.2 0
2. The Concurring Opinion, Chief Justice Burger
Chief Justice Burger concurred only in the majority's con-
clusion.2 01 The Chief Justice maintained that a capital case in
which the defendant is completely denied access to psychiatric
assistance is so extreme that it cannot be extended to a situation
other than a variation on the same facts.20 2
3. The Dissenting Opinion, Justice Rehnquist
Justice Rehnquist agreed that certain indigent defendants
with a legitimate insanity defense are entitled to psychiatric de-
198. The majority listed the factors in Ake's case which made it likely that the ques-
tion of Ake's sanity at the time of the offense would be a significant factor in his defense,
enabling Ake to meet the threshold for state-funded psychiatric defense assistance.
These factors were: 1) Ake's only defense was an insanity defense; 2) Ake's behavior at a
pre-trial hearing was such that the trial judge ordered, sua sponte, to have him examined
for competency; 3) Ake was found by a state psychiatrist to be incompetent to stand
trial; 4) Ake was rendered competent to stand trial only on large doses of medication; 5)
state psychiatrists found Ake mentally ill six months after the offenses and suggested
that his mental illness may have begun years earlier; and 6) Oklahoma's insanity defense
puts the initial burden of proof on the defendant. Id. at 86.
199. Id. at 86-87.
200. Ake's conviction was reversed due to a violation of his fourteenth amendment
due process right to psychiatric defense assistance at the capital sentencing. Id. Though
the Court listed factors making it likely that Ake would meet the threshold for psychiat-
ric defense assistance at trial (see supra text accompanying note 198), the majority opin-
ion expressly avoided stating that such factors, alone or in combination, are necessary to
make this finding. Ake, 470 U.S. at 86 n.12.
201. Id. at 87 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
202. Id. "The facts of the case and the question presented confine the actual holding
of the Court. In capital cases the finality of the sentence imposed warrants protections
that may or may not be required in other cases. Nothing in the Court's opinion reaches
noncapital cases." Id.
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fense assistance.10 3 However, the Justice did not believe that the
defendant in this case was entitled to such assistance.
The evidence of the brutal murders perpetrated on the victims,
and of the month-long crime spree following the murders, would
not seem to raise any question of sanity unless one were to adopt
the dubious doctrine that no one in his right mind would commit
a murder. The defendant's forty-four page confession, given more
than a month after the crimes, does not suggest insanity; nor does
the failure of Ake's attorney to move for a competency hearing at
the time the codefendant moved for one.204
Justice Rehnquist maintained that the majority's holding
should have been limited to capital cases. Further, he disagreed
with the majority's requirement for a partisan psychiatrist. 205 Fi-
nally, Justice Rehnquist referred to the majority's sentencing
standard in which the defendant who faces evidence of future
dangerousness from the prosecution's psychiatrist has a per se
right to his own psychiatric defense assistance. He described this
statement as dicta, and not warranted on the facts of this
case. 
206
V. Analysis
The Ake decision imposed a fairly specific constitutional
standard upon the states and federal government, mandating
203. Justice Rehnquist stated in his dissent:
[T]here may well be capital trials in which the State assumes the burden of prov-
ing sanity at the guilt phase, or "future dangerousness" at the sentencing phase,
and makes significant use of psychiatric testimony in carrying its burden, where
"fundamental fairness" would require that an indigent defendant have access to a
court-appointed psychiatrist to evaluate him independently and - if the evalua-
tion so warrants - contradicts such testimony.
Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 90-91.
205. After conceding that psychiatric defense assistance may be appropriate for
some indigent defendants, Justice Rehnquist wrote, "I would limit the rule to capital
cases, and make clear that the entitlement is to an independent psychiatric evaluation,
not to a defense consultant."
Id. at 87.
206. In discussing the majority's requirement for a psychiatrist who will "assist in
evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense," Id. at 92 (emphasis in origi-
nal)(citing Ake majority opinion, Id. at 83), Justice Rehnquist stated, "I see no reason
why the defendant should be entitled to an opposing view, or to a 'defense' advocate."
Id. at 92.
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the provision of a defense-oriented psychiatrist who will "con-
duct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, prepa-
ration, and presentation of the defense. 20 7 Additionally, using
the due process balancing analysis set out in Ake,2 °0 it is argua-
ble that Ake's holding is applicable to any type of expert defense
assistance that can be demonstrated as necessary to an indi-
gent's defense.20 9 Despite Ake, many of the states and the fed-
eral government facing the issue of psychiatric defense assis-
tance for indigent defendants continue to rely on pre-Ake
legislation or case law210 which falls far below this constitution-
ally mandated standard.
A. The Ake Standard
The Ake Court limited its analysis to the due process rights
of the defendant, omitting equal protection and sixth amend-
ment considerations.2 1 1 The absence of a recognized equal pro-
tection right to psychiatric assistance is underscored in the Ake
standard which restricts the defendant's right to receive funding
directly or to choose his own psychiatrist. 12 This is consistent
with the earlier decision of Ross v. Moffitt in which the Supreme
Court held that states are not required to "duplicate the legal
arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defend-
ant.'" By avoiding the sixth amendment, the Court also de-
clined to equate effective defense assistance by a psychiatric ex-
pert with the sixth amendment requirement for effective
assistance of counsel. Although the Ake standard calls for "com-
petent"214 psychiatric assistance, the Court resisted the need to
207. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
208. Id. at 77-79. See supra text accompanying note 167.
209. The National Forensic Center is in agreement:
Where the expert testimony or guidance is critical to the outcome of the criminal
trial, it is reasonable to assume that the doctrine of Ake v. Oklahoma can be ex-
tended to imply a constitutional right to the assistance and testimony available in
a wide range of fields of expertise.
Right to an Expert, supra note 13, at 2.
210. See supra notes 112, 113, 115, 125, 126 and accompanying text.
211. Ake, 470 U.S. at 87 n.13.
212. Id. at 83.
213. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974). See supra text accompanying notes 26
& 27.
214. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
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put the psychiatrist's actual performance on the same constitu-
tional level as is required of an attorney. In addition, the Court
avoided a construction of the sixth amendment right to compul-
sory attendance of witnesses which would have required the
state to provide funds to enable an indigent defendant to obtain
other necessary expert witnesses." 5
Ake does demand that at both capital and non-capital tri-
als, the states must implement a system to provide appropriate
indigent defendants with partisan psychiatric assistance. A de-
fendant must first make an ex parte showing to the trial court
that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in the de-
fense.21 6 Once a defendant has reached this threshold, the state
is then required to provide the defendant with one 17 "compe-
tent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination
and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the
defense."21 While the defendant is not entitled to choose his
expert,21 9 the Court is clearly requiring states to provide a parti-
215. Illinois is the only jurisdiction which predicates an indigent defendant's right
to expert assistance on the state and federal constitutional right to compulsory attend-
ance of witnesses. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; ILL. CONST. Art. 1, § 8. Interpreting this provi-
sion, the Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Watson, 35 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645
(1966), held that where an accused forger was denied funds to obtain the services of a
questioned document examiner, his fundamental right to summon witnesses had been so
weakened that it was effectively denied. People v. Nichols, 70 Il. App. 3d 748, 388
N.E.2d 984 (1979) followed Watson, and required the state to provide the defendant
with access to psychiatric assistance.
216. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83. Factors which have been cited by the Court as those which
meet the threshold requirement include: the intention to use insanity as the defendant's
sole defense; the defendant's conduct; defendant's competency status (is he competent to
stand trial; is he considered competent only with medication); results of any past psychi-
atric examinations; and whether the applicable state law requires the defendant to meet
the initial burden of proof of insanity. Id. at 86.
217. "[T]he obligation of the State is limited to the provision of one competent psy-
chiatrist ...." Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
218. Id. at 83 (emphasis added). The requirement for a competent psychiatrist has
developed among the lower federal courts since United States ex rel Smith v. Baldi, 344
U.S. 561 (1953) and McGarty v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 151 (1st Cir. 1951). See supra notes
12, 46-51, 81-84 and accompanying text. The lower federal courts seem to be in general
agreement that once defendant has produced some evidence of insanity, the provision of
an impartial, competent psychiatric expert will provide equal access to justice. Until
Ake, however, the duties of such a psychiatrist have been unclear. See supra text accom-
panying notes 108-10.
219. "This is not to say, of course, that the indigent defendant has a constitutional
right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or receive funds to hire his own."
Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
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san expert who will prepare and present his diagnosis in a way
that will be helpful to the defense effort.220
in his dissent, Justice Rehnquist supported his disagree-
ment with the majority's standard by offering facts to demon-
strate that Ake was not insane,22 apparently confusing the issue
of the defendant's sanity itself with the majority's requirement
that a defendant seeking psychiatric defense assistance make a
threshold showing that his sanity will be a significant defense
factor at trial. This line of reasoning is without merit. The opin-
ion of the majority did not impose a duty upon courts to deter-
mine a defendant's sanity. The majority made it clear that meet-
ing the requisite threshold entitles a defendant to a state funded
psychiatrist who will assist in defense preparation on the issue
of the defendant's insanity. The determination of whether or not
the defendant is sane remains for the fact finder.222
B. Threshold Requirement - At Trial and At Sentencing
To qualify for state paid psychiatric defense assistance, all
defendants at the trial level, capital and non-capital, must
demonstrate to the court that sanity will be a significant defense
issue.223 By creating this threshold without providing guidance
as to what factors constitute a "significant defense issue, '224 the
Court is permitting some discretion on the part of the trial
court. Clearly, a defendant such as Ake,223 whose only defense is
insanity, would meet this threshold. However, this is one aspect
of the Ake standard for psychiatric defense assistance which
must be refined further.
For psychiatric defense assistance at a capital sentencing
proceeding, a defendant need not make the same threshold
220. See The Supreme Court 1984 Term - Leading Cases, supra note 10, at 136.
The duties of a psychiatric expert under Ake are discussed and it is suggested that what
is required "looks very much like the right to a partisan expert." Id.
221. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
222. Discussing a psychiatrist's role in the trial process, the majority noted: "psychi-
atrists ideally assist lay jurors, who generally have no training in psychiatric matters, to
make a sensible and educated determination about the mental condition of the defend-
ant at the time of the offense." Ake, 470 U.S. at 80-81 (emphasis added).
223. Id. at 83.
224. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
225. See supra text accompanying note 198.
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showing as must be made to obtain such assistance at trial. If, at
a capital sentencing procedure, the prosecution uses psychiatric
evidence of the defendant's future dangerousness, the defendant
will be entitled to "a psychiatric examination on relevant issues,
to the testimony of the psychiatrist, and to assistance in prepa-
ration at the sentencing phase. '12" This is consistent with the
Supreme Court's long held adherence to the principle that capi-
tal defendants are entitled to every possible advantage at trial
and sentencing.2 27 At the trial level, the Court has placed limita-
tions on the indigent's right to psychiatric defense assistance by
placing the burden upon the defendant to show that such assis-
tance is necessary. At a capital sentencing procedure, however,
this right is triggered by the prosecution's use of psychiatric wit-
nesses who testify as to the defendant's future dangerousness.
Thus, if the prosecution wishes to present such testimony, a
court has no discretion to deny a request for psychiatric defense
assistance.22 8
C. Extending the Due Process Balancing Test
Using the Ake due process analysis which balanced the de-
fendant's interests, the state's interests, and the value of a psy-
chiatrist's assistance at trial against the risks associated with the
absence of a psychiatrist's assistance,22 e it is arguable that the
226. Ake, 470 U.S. at 84.
227. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
228. Ake, 470 U.S. at 84 (emphasis added). The Court, in its discussion of the state's
presentation of psychiatric testimony on the question of future dangerousness, stated:
Without a psychiatrist's assistance, the defendant can not offer a well-informed
expert's opposing view, and thereby loses a significant opportunity to raise in the
juror's minds questions about the State's proof of an aggravating factor. In such a
circumstance, where the consequence of error is so great, the relevance of respon-
sive psychiatric testimony so evident, and the burden on the State so slim, due
process requires access to a psychiatric examination on relevant issues, to the tes-
timony of the psychiatrist, and to assistance in preparation at the sentencing
phase.
Id. (emphasis added).
229. Id. at 77. Prior to its decision in Ake, this test was utilized by the Supreme
Court in determining that an indigent defendant, who was charged with a paternity suit,
was entitled to a state funded blood test to determine whether the defendant had a
familial connection with the plaintiff. The Court balanced the interests involved, which
included: the defendant's substantial interest in the possible forced imposition of famil-
ial bonds; the substantial financial interest of the state; and the considerable risk of an
erroneous disposition of the case in the absence of such blood tests. Little v. Streater,
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Ake holding is applicable to any type of expert defense assis-
tance.3 0 This due process analysis can also be construed to re-
quire that testing and other necessary expert defense assistance
must be provided for the defense of an indigent defendant,2 3 1 if
he meets the appropriate threshold. The truth-seeking function
of the adversary system, which the Court sought to enhance by
the Ake decision,2 3 2 will not be improved if indigent defendants
have access to psychiatric assistance, but not to other expert de-
fense services. Thus, the Ake decision should not remain unique
to psychiatric experts.
D. Current Standards for Psychiatric Defense Assistance
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Ake, both the fed-
eral government and most states had implemented various
mechanisms to provide psychiatric and other defense assistance
to indigent defendants. 3 Indeed, under most of these provi-
452 U.S. 1 (1981).
230. The Supreme Court 1984 Term - Leading Cases, supra note 13. In discuss-
ing the indigent defendant's right to expert defense assistance, the note suggests that
"[g]iven the reasoning in Ake, courts should recognize the due process right of indigent
defendants to the assistance of any expert genuinely necessary to the adequate presenta-
tion of their defense." Id. at 137. See also The Right to an Expert, supra note 13, at 2
("Applying the [Ake] Court's three-step analysis, it would be relatively easy to provide
examples in which the evaluation, guidance, and testimony of [a] pathologist, a pharma-
cologist or a ballistics expert would be critical to and should be provided for an indigent
criminal defendant.").
231. Since Ake was decided, the Supreme Court has been faced with a capital sen-
tencing in which the petitioner challenged, among other things, the trial court's refusal
to appoint a criminal investigator, a fingerprint expert and a ballistics expert (although
the requested psychiatric assistance was provided). The Court, reversing and remanding
on other grounds, cited Ake in agreeing with the trial court on this issue. In making this
determination the Court relied upon the petitioner's inability to show that such assis-
tance would be beneficial to his defense. The fact that the Court used Ake to make a
determination with respect to nonpsychiatric experts is significant because it signals the
Court's readiness to apply the Ake holding to any expert defense assistance which is
required by an indigent defendant. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323-24 n.1
(1985).
232. The Court noted:
We recognized long ago that mere access to the courthouse doors does not by itself
assure a proper functioning of the adversary process, and that a criminal trial is
fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an indigent defendant without
making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the building of
an effective defense.
Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
233. See supra notes 115, 125, 126 and accompanying text.
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss1/6
AFTER AKE
sions, any necessary form of expert defense assistance could be
obtained by the indigent defendant.23 ' It would appear, there-
fore, that Ake does little to improve the defense tools that are
currently available to the indigent criminal defendant. In setting
out the duties to be performed by a state funded psychiatric ex-
pert, however, the Ake Court rendered most of the current legis-
lation inadequate. The level of psychiatric assistance currently
provided to indigent criminal defendants, whether by funding or
court appointment of the expert, falls far below Ake's partisan
psychiatric standard. 35 Funds are not provided in amounts that
will buy the services of a competent psychiatric expert,2 36 and
the appointment of an impartial or disinterested psychiatrist
can hardly meet this defense-oriented, partisan standard23 7
Therefore, indigent defendants who have been provided with
substandard psychiatric defense assistance have a legitimate due
process claim which should be asserted under Ake.
The federal government and a majority of states which pro-
vide expert defense assistance to indigent defendants do so by
making funds available for the purpose of hiring an expert.2 8
Freedom to choose one's own defense expert would clearly com-
ply with Ake's requirement for partisan expert assistance. How-
ever, the funding provided under these statutes generally does
not exceed $300.239 The services of a "competent psychiatrist"
234. Id.
235. See supra text accompanying note 186.
236. See Medico - Legal Relations Committee Eleventh Revision of
Medico - Legal Guidelines for Physicians and Attorneys, 54 Westchester Med. Bull.
14 (1986) (this article suggests that a doctor's fee for consultation with an attorney and
one half day of testimony should range from $1000 to $1500); Interview with Lawrence
Loeb, M.D., Clinical Associate Professor of Psychiatry, Cornell U. Medical College; Ad-
junct Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law (Aug. 18, 1986) (Dr. Loeb, a fo-
rensic psychiatrist, assessed the $300 provided to indigent defendants for expert defense
assistance, under both the federal and New York statutes, as "a pittance" relative to the
actual time required, and indicated that psychiatrists who take such clients consider
their efforts to be pro bono.).
237. See The Supreme Court 1984 Term - Leading Cases, supra note 13, at 136.
In discussing the adequacy of court-appointed psychiatric defense experts in light of the
Ake holding, it was stated that "[e]ven if states retain the right to appoint expert wit-
nesses, it is difficult to see how a psychiatrist who assists with defense strategy, educates
counsel sufficiently for effective cross-examination, and testifies on mitigation of punish-
ment could remain strictly impartial throughout the proceedings." Id.
238. See supra notes 115, 125 and accompanying text.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 130 & 131.
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generally cannot be obtained for $300, especially one who is re-
quired to "conduct an appropriate examination and assist in
evaluation, preparation and presentation of the defense. 24 0 Sim-
ilarly, to fulfill Ake's requirements, states cannot rely on the
funding which is generally provided to legal aid or public de-
fender programs. Such programs are under severe budget re-
straints and cannot afford all of the expert services generally re-
quired to defend their clients. 2 41 The funding of a defendant's
choice of psychiatric defense experts will comply with the Ake
standard only if the funding is made available in realistic
amounts.
The states which provide psychiatric defense assistance to
indigent defendants by court appointment are not in compliance
with Ake's partisan standard if the expert is required to be im-
partial or to report to both the prosecutor and the defense attor-
ney.24 2 While the Ake Court specifically permits states to ap-
point psychiatrists to assist the defense efforts of indigent
criminal defendants, Ake also requires the court-appointed psy-
chiatrist to be part of the defense team.24 3 If a court-appointed
psychiatrist does not "assist in evaluation, preparation, and
presentation of the defense, 244 the defendant has been denied
due process.
E. Post-Ake Decisions
Ake created a standard by which every jurisdiction can
measure the constitutionality of the psychiatric defense services
it provides to indigent defendants. Psychiatric defense assis-
tance under Ake requires an expert who is part of the defense
240. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83. See supra note 132 (an example of the cost of mounting a
successful insanity defense).
241. See N. LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR (1982). Quoting
the National Legal Aid and Defender Association with regard to a comprehensive na-
tional survey of criminal defense funding and needs, " 'the resources allocated to indi-
gent defense services have been found grossly deficient in light of the needs of adequate
and effective representation. Relatively few indigent defendants have the benefit of in-
vestigation and other expert assistance in their defense.'" Id. at 14 (quoting NATIONAL
LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE 70 (1973)).
242. See supra text accompanying note 133.
243. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
244. Id.
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team.24 5 Such psychiatric defense assistance must be provided to
a defendant who can make an ex parte showing to the trial court
that his sanity is to be a significant defense factor,24' and to cap-
ital defendants at sentencing proceedings in which the prosecu-
tion will use psychiatric evidence of future dangerousness
against the defendant.247
While some courts recognize that Ake requires appropriate
defendants to receive partisan psychiatric defense assistance,248
others have avoided the need to enforce this standard. Courts
have distinguished Ake on its facts,249 particularly where a de-
fendant's request for nonpsychiatric defense assistance has been
denied. 250 Additionally, an unreasonably high threshold has been
245. See supra text accompanying note 220.
246. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
247. Id. at 84.
248. United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1985) (the appellant was held to
have been denied adequate psychiatric defense assistance under Ake when the trial court
appointed an impartial expert to make a psychiatric evaluation which was available to
both the defense and prosecution); Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918, 935 (11th Cir.
1985) ("We hold that examination of Martin by seven independent or defense-recruited
mental health experts more than adequately met the requirements of Ake."); Magwood
v. Smith, 608 F. Supp. 218 (N.D. Ala. 1985) (Ake was distinguished from the petitioner
who was examined by six court-appointed, impartial psychiatric experts, three of whom
testified favorably for the defense, although the petitioner's request for independent psy-
chiatric defense assistance was denied).
249. See, e.g., Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1986) (A convicted
murder defendant's request for a psychiatric examination before sentencing was denied
by the trial court. The Eleventh Circuit recognized that the defendant needed a psychi-
atric examination to enable him to demonstrate his insanity at the time of the offense,
but held that Ake did not apply because the defendant did not request such assistance
to present mitigating circumstances.).
250. See, e.g., Schultz v. Indiana, 497 N.E.2d 531 (Ind. 1986) (The defendant, who
was convicted of murder, appealed because his request for a forensic serologist and tool-
mark expert was denied, even though the state had access to such experts. Ake was held
to be distinguishable because the results of such testing is precise and not subject to
varying interpretations; therefore, neither the defense nor the prosecution had the ad-
vantage by employing the experts.); Stafford v. Love, 726 P.2d 894 (Okla. 1986) (The
trial court's denial of funding to provide the petitioner with the expert services of a
hypnotist was upheld as being distinguishable from Ake.); Standridge v. Oklahoma, 701
P.2d 761 (Okla. 1985) (The appellate court upheld the trial court's refusal to provide
funds for defense employment of a bitemark expert because the Ake holding reaches
only psychiatric defense assistance.); Tennessee v. Evans, 710 S.W.2d 530 (Tenn. 1985)
(The appellate court distinguished Ake on its facts and upheld the conviction of a de-
fendant who had no access to expert ballistic testing, although the conviction rested on
the state's ballistics tests.).
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employed to deny psychiatric defense assistance.2 5' Courts have
misinterpreted the Ake requirement for a psychiatrist who will
assist the defense effort at trial,252 and have ignored Ake's re-
251. While the Court expressly avoided any delineation of what constitutes the req-
uisite threshold which will entitle an indigent defendant to psychiatric defense assis-
tance, see supra text accompanying note 200, it did set forth factors which would make
it likely that a particular defendant would meet the threshold, see supra text accompa-
nying note 198. Many courts have construed the Ake threshold to be much higher than
the Supreme Court appears to have intended. See, e.g., Volson v. Blackburn, 794 F.2d
173 (5th Cir. 1986) (The trial court's denial of a convicted rapist's request for a sanity
examination to enter an insanity defense was upheld because the defendant did not meet
the Ake threshold by failing to exhibit the type of bizarre behavior that defendant Ake
had exhibited at his trial. Id. at 176 n.4. The Fifth Circuit failed to note that defendant
Ake's behavior at preliminary hearings was controlled and rational.); See also Cartwright
v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203 (10th Cir. 1986) (The threshold showing that would have
entitled a capital defendant to psychiatric defense assistance was not met despite the
defendant's tendency to black out and get severe headaches.); Wall v. Arkansas, 289 Ark.
570, 715 S.W.2d 208 (1986) (Based upon a competency examination by a state employed
psychiatrist who concluded that the defendant was competent to stand trial and did not
lack the capacity to appreciate the nature of his offense, the defendant did not meet
Ake's threshold showing for psychiatric defense assistance. The court here fails to recog-
nize that a competency examination does not reflect on the mental state of the defend-
ant at the time of the offense.); Eddy v. Georgia, 25 Ga. 321, 338 S.E.2d 262 (1986) (The
court rejected the argument that psychiatric defense assistance should be provided for
exploration of the defense of temporary insanity for a defendant with no prior criminal
record and who had a close relationship with the victim. This case represents a good
example of the areas in which the Ake threshold was left undefined by the Court,
thereby permitting the trial court to use its discretion in granting psychiatric defense
assistance, rather than denying psychiatric defense assistance to the defendant by distin-
guishing Ake on its facts.); Liles v. Oklahoma, 702 P.2d 1025 (Okla. 1985) (The appellate
court affirmed the defendant's death sentence, holding that the trial court met Ake's
requirements when it denied the defendant's request for psychiatric defense assistance
due to his inability to demonstrate a threshold need for such assistance. The court here
focused on three factors: first, a positive competency exam, which is not indicative of a
defendant's mental state at the time of the crime; second, on the defendant's failure to
raise the insanity defense, which he may not have wanted to attempt without prior con-
sultation with a psychiatrist; and finally, on the fact that the state did not rely on psy-
chiatric evidence at trial, which was held by the Ake Court to be a factor only at sentenc-
ing.); North Carolina v. Massey, 316 N.C. 558, 342 S.E.2d 811 (1986) (Evidence that an
indigent defendant is mildly retarded is not a sufficient basis to require the appointment
of a psychiatrist to assist in defense efforts.). But see North Carolina v. Gambrell, 318
N.C. 249, 347 S.E.2d 390 (1986) (The trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a
psychiatrist to assist in his defense was reversible error, because defendant's behavior
and psychiatric evaluations showed that he met the Ake threshold showing for psychiat-
ric defense assistance.).
252. Magwood v. Smith, 791 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1986) (A court-appointed, three-
member lunacy commission concluded that the defendant was insane at the time he
committed murder, but counsel's request for funds to retain a counseling psychiatrist
was denied. While the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the requirements of Ake had
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quirement for psychiatric defense assistance for a capital de-
fendant at sentencing whenever evidence of the defendant's fu-
ture dangerousness is to be presented.253
VI. Conclusion
Ake v. Oklahoma continued the long line of Supreme Court
cases which protected criminally accused indigent defendants
from their inability to finance an effective defense. 2" Ake delin-
been met, only a psychiatric evaluation was provided for the defendant, without assis-
tance in preparation and presentation of the defense.); Glass v. Blackburn, 791 F.2d 1165
(5th Cir. 1986) (The Fifth Circuit held that Ake's requirement for one competent psychi-
atrist was met when a court-appointed psychiatrist testified, at trial and sentencing, that
the defendant was sane at the time he murdered his victims. The Ake Court's require-
ment for assistance in the defense effort could not have been met by testimony which
was unfavorable to the defense effort.); Holmes v. Alabama, No. 6-871 (Ala. August 13,
1986) (LExIs, state library, Ala. file) (A life sentence for a habitual felony offender was
upheld, despite the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for psychiatric defense
assistance. The appellate court held that Ake is not applicable in non-capital cases. This
is clearly a misinterpretation of the Ake holding which provides psychiatric defense as-
sistance to any appropriate defendant at trial.). But see Palmer v. Indiana, 486 N.E.2d
477 (Ind. 1985) (Indiana Supreme Court judicially modifies Indiana's statutory practice
of appointing three disinterested experts in order to comply with Ake by requiring the
experts to consult with the defendant upon the assertion of an insanity defense).
253. Pennsylvania v. Morales, 508 Pa. 50, 494 A.2d 367 (1985). A capital defendant
who appealed from the death penalty contended that the trial court erred in denying his
request, prior to sentencing, for a continuance in order to secure the appearance of a
psychiatrist. Although the state in this case had presented no psychiatric evidence of the
defendant's future dangerousness, the court erroneously cited Ake, stating that "[tihe
United States Supreme Court has recently held that where a defendant in a capital case
makes a preliminary showing that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor at his
sentencing, the state must provide the defendant with access to a psychiatrist .... " Id.
at 378 n.10. But see Lindsey v. State, 254 Ga. 444, 330 S.E.2d 563 (Ga. 1985) (The capi-
tal defendant's contention that the state failed to provide him with adequate psychiatric
defense assistance at trial and sentencing was rejected by the Georgia Supreme Court.
The court reasoned that Ake does not require the state to provide the defendant with his
choice of psychiatrists, nor does it require the state to provide psychiatric defense assis-
tance at a capital sentencing where the prosecution presents no psychiatric testimony
regarding the defendant's future dangerousness.); Tuggle v. Virginia, 230 Va. 99, 334
S.E.2d 838 (1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 3309 (1986) (On remand from the United
States Supreme Court for consideration under Ake, the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that the capital defendant's request for independent psychiatric defense assistance at the
guilt phase of his trial was not erroneously denied by the trial judge under Ake. How-
ever, the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for independent psychiatric de-
fense assistance at his capital sentencing proceeding constituted error under Ake because
the prosecution presented its own psychiatric evidence of the defendant's future
dangerousness.).
254. See supra text accompanying notes 15-34.
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eated a clear constitutional standard which requires the provi-
sion of a state funded psychiatrist to indigent defendants who
demonstrate that sanity will be a significant defense issue.255
The psychiatrist's duties are to be defense-oriented, including an
examination of the defendant and assistance in the evaluation,
preparation and presentation of the defense.2 58 In a capital sen-
tencing proceeding, if the prosecution uses psychiatric evidence
of the defendant's future dangerousness, Ake entitles the de-
fendant to a psychiatric examination, a psychiatrist's assistance
in preparation for the sentencing proceeding, as well as his ex-
pert testimony.57 In addition, using a due process analysis
which balances the individual defendant's interests, the state's
interests, and the value of such expert assistance in relation to
the risk of error in its absence, the Court left open the possibil-
ity for the Ake holding to be applicable to all types of expert
defense assistance.2 58
While the Ake Court clearly defined the requirements for
providing partisan psychiatric defense assistance to qualified in-
digent criminal defendants, the decision has not been imple-
mented fully throughout the country.259 Many jurisdictions con-
tinue to provide funding for psychiatric experts at levels far
below what is actually required for realistic psychiatric defense
assistance. 60 Other jurisdictions appoint "impartial" experts or
experts who report to both the prosecution and the defense, thus
straying far from the partisan assistance called for by Ake. 2 1
Ake v. Oklahoma represents another step by the Court to-
ward providing indigent defendants with the "tools of an ade-
quate defense. ' 262 These "tools" lose validity, however, when
they are inaccessible to defense attorneys. When an insanity de-
fense is asserted without expert psychiatric guidance, the Su-
255. See supra text accompanying notes 183-85.
256. See supra text accompanying note 186.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 187-89.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 229-31.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 248-53.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 238-41.
261. See supra text accompanying note 242.
262. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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preme Court's "tools" have failed to insure an "adequate
defense".
Susan S. Brown
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